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THE PLACE OF SOCIOLOGY AMONG THE SCIENCES.

AN attempt to determine the place of sociology among the sciences must obviously be based upon a general survey. I should first set apart (a) the sciences of reality in its ultimate nature and implications, in other words the metaphysical sciences, (b) the sciences of formal as distinguished from essential reality, namely logic and mathematics, (c) the sciences concerned directly not with reality but with its artistic and scientific representation, namely æsthetics and what one may perhaps call scientific. This leaves us with the sciences that deal directly with essential reality in its relative aspect. I would here first distinguish the primary sciences, that is the sciences dealing respectively with typical units in a single grade of reality. Here, I think, we must recognise a fundamental dualism, that of the physical (or chiefly objective) and the psychical (or chiefly subjective) sciences. The physical group would consist of these: physics, of which the electron (perhaps, more strictly, the electron in æther) is the basic, the atom the crowning conception; chemistry, of which the atom is the basic, the cell the crowning conception (these two sciences possibly admit of final unification); physiology, of which the cell is the basic, the organism the crowning conception. The psychical or psychological group would consist of three sciences having their physical counterpart—the correspondence, however, is only partial—in the threefold division of physiology into vegetable, animal, human; they are the sciences of non-conscious life, of conscious or perceptive life, and of self-conscious or apperceptive life. (The science of non-conscious life has perhaps no very definite individuality. Its methods must be in the main analogical; thus we attempt to divine the nature of plant-life mainly from what we seem to be able to infer of our own non-conscious life.)

Sociology cannot, I think, be included among the primary sciences. The social organism on the physical side and the social

consciousness on the psychical side are merely suggestive metaphors. Among plants and among those primitive animal kinds that from the psychical point of view are probably more nearly related to plants than to the higher animals, there has apparently taken place a progressive building up of incipiently organic aggregate into fully organic integrates; but in the animal world there exists no field for such relations where the demarcation of individual and group is clear and unquestionable. In order, however, to deal adequately with the actual world we have need also of certain secondary or complementary sciences. These sciences do not admit of any precise arrangement; but they may be roughly distributed into two groups according as either of two kinds of relations tends to be paramount, first, relations between members of the same grade of reality or intra-grade relations, where the fundamental distinction is that of unit and class or kind, and secondly, relations between different grades of reality or inter-grade relations, where the fundamental distinction is that of kind and environment—we might perhaps recognise also an intermediate group, concerned chiefly with relations between sub-grades. The first group should perhaps be divided into two further groups, the physical and the psychical, corresponding with the division of the primary sciences. The distinction between unit and class is far less clear in respect of the physical than of the psychical sciences. Still, on the lines of this distinction, we have, I think, corresponding with the science of primary physics, the science of secondary or molar physics, which would obviously include astronomy, and also, though perhaps less obviously, geology. I should regard sociology as the secondary science corresponding with the primary science of psychology. Coming now to the group dealing with inter-grade relations, I think that the science of the evolution of living kinds belongs to this group at least in respect of the earlier stages, where the relations between living kinds and their lifeless environment—life as moulded by nature—are the more important. Another, perhaps the highest, example of this group is economics, or the science of material wealth—nature as moulded by human life—the data of which are partly certain human characteristics, partly certain properties of the living and lifeless environment. It should be observed that the principles which these sciences formulate are to a great extent compound or derived—perhaps they will all eventually prove derivable from simpler principles—and are only imperfectly generalised, that is they are concerned with actual events or circumstances of the present and still more of the past. The principle of natural selection may serve as an illustration. It is clearly a compound or rather recomposed principle, being founded chiefly upon the two principles, neither of them primary, of Malthusianism and

variability, and it is only imperfectly generalised, being concerned mainly with unfolding the past development of kinds.

The above arrangement is founded entirely upon what seem to be essential differences in reality. It is not intended as a practical or handy classification. Thus the sciences of botany, zoology, anthropology, sciences so far not very greatly advanced beyond the chiefly preliminary work of systematisation of data and historical reconstruction, would probably in respect of the further work of the establishment of adequate causal connection have to be classed as belonging partly to the primary science of physiology, of which they would form special branches, partly to the secondary sciences of physiological evolution.

With regard now specially to sociology, I think that the science has two clear, though closely interdependent, divisions. The one is concerned primarily with relations of influence. Such relations are for the most part assimilating, but also to a very considerable extent differentiating (as when an individual mind or perhaps a number of minds react violently against the psychical environment). Here sociology is most closely connected with psychology. The main difference between them is that whereas psychology deals with human nature primarily as self-developed, sociology deals with human nature primarily as influenced by thoughts, etc., that were originally suggested by others—not directly, but through the medium of either naturally or conventionally expressive phenomena, especially the phenomena of language. The other division is concerned primarily with relations of function. Such relations are for the most part co-operative, but also to a great extent competitive. Here sociology is perhaps more closely connected with economics. The main difference between them is that while economics deals with human relations primarily as shaped by the demands of the non-conscious and merely conscious life and as bearing on the creation of material wealth, sociology deals with human relations primarily as shaped by the demands of the self-conscious life and as bearing on the actualisation of social ideals.

One last point. The systematisation question has been said to have lost its former apparent importance, the reason given being the increasing tendencies towards the unification of scientific knowledge and obliteration of the old dividing lines. Such a position seems to me to be founded on a misunderstanding of the tendencies indicated. For the most part they are, I think, tendencies in the direction not of analytic but of synthetic unification, where the dividing lines are not obliterated but transcended. They form in fact, I think, part of a general movement in civilisation, the course of which, after having in the past been chiefly analytic, differentiating and in a sense disintegrating, will in the future tend—to a very great extent it may never be more than a most

imperfectly realised tendency—to be synthetic, assimilating and re-integrating. I think also that this analytico-synthetic movement needs to be carefully distinguished from certain tendencies of an antithetico-synthetic character agreeing perhaps with the Hegelian formula of thesis, antithesis, synthesis, and, I am further inclined to believe, though I cannot claim firsthand knowledge, that Hegel himself pressed into his system tendencies really forming part of the movement of which I am now speaking. But I must not here proceed further with this matter.

P. J. HUGHESDEN.

EDITORIAL NOTE.

For the information of those interested in the more methodological and epistemological problems associated with sociological studies, it may be mentioned that the above paper by Mr. Hughesden is one of a sequence. The two following papers preceded Mr. Hughesden's:—

(1) *Durkheim : a brief Memoir.* Vol. X, No. 2.

(2) *Sociology : its successes and its failures,* by S. H. Swinny. Vol. XI, No. 1.

In the next number of the *Review* will appear the first of a series of studies entitled : *The Interpretative Method.*

THE WAR MIND : A PROJECT OF CO-OPERATIVE STUDY.

LETTER ADDRESSED TO THOSE INVITED TO PARTICIPATE.

DEAR SIR,

The Sociological Society is planning a series of discussions towards study of what is popularly called "the war-mind"; hoping thereby to illuminate not only its qualities and defects, but also (and as far as may be in a systematic way), its origins, development, mode of working and resultants.

The immediate object of investigation is as to the types of emotional and intellectual reaction manifested in a society absorbed by the anxieties, efforts, hopes, fears of an internecine struggle for existence. In short, the primary problem may be stated as the psychology of marginal survival. In so far as characteristic traits, generated in a society thrown for a moment sheer on to the margin of survival, get fixed as mental habits, presumably "the war-mind" develops. Subsequent persistence, modification or loss of these mental habits in after-war time, have also to be investigated.

Important doubtless, both as to impulses and habits, is the distinction between combatants and non-combatants; and, further, between the more or less loose coherence of non-combatant groups on the one hand, and on the other the intimate incorporation of combatants into organized bodies (*i.e.* companies, regiments and armies), of long-established tradition and definite orientation towards the tasks, risks, opportunities of war. If also data are available, it would be useful to institute a comparison between the social and physiological reactions of this war with those of past wars, and notably, perhaps, the wars against revolutionary and imperial France.

The first requisite for such studies is, we take it, an adequate basis of factual observation; and in the second place, some more general treatment of the facts by way of interpreting their meaning and valuing their significance. That being so, we venture to make an appeal for co-operation:

- (a) to those who, like novelists, poets, dramatists, are professionally practised in the study of intellectual and emotional reactions exhibited by individuals and groups in the ordinary situations of life, its customary crises, and its normal phases of growth and decline,
- (b) To those who, like the clergy and social reformers, are accustomed to observe and practically handle some of the deeper interactions of the inner and the outer-life.
- (c) To those who, like the older alienists and the newer medico-

psychologists, are of trained skill in the diagnosis and treatment of morbid states of mind.

- (d) To those who, like social psychologists and students of child-psychology, and of adolescence, have built up a verified system of knowledge about the growth and behaviour of the mind in groups and individuals, and in the phases of personal and social evolution.

We venture then to ask you to favour us with some statement of what your observations of the past five years have led you to regard as the salient aspects of "the war-mind," and moreover alike in its qualities and defects. Without wishing to limit the scope of the proposed discussion, or even to define with precision the limits of the enquiry, the Council of the Society makes the following suggestions as to what it deems the most fruitful line of enquiry.

It is to be remarked that some observers of "the war-mind," notably like Romain Rolland in his book, *Liluli*, emphasize its defects as the most impulsive of illusions; while others have discovered in its qualities the basis of a transcendent coming-together of all classes in a "sacred union." Hence two schools of thought tend to appear. One of them observes and analyses the reversions to barbarism and savagery through recrudescence of "the animalism of herd instincts," and through perversion of the moral sentiments by habitual recourse to violence, theft, lying, deceit, chicanery. The other school emphasizes the traits which evoke co-operant enthusiasm, heroism, self-sacrifice and the energizing of groups or individuals to higher potential than is customary in ordinary times of peace. The former school, in a word, sees war as degrading and repressing life; the latter sees it as enhancing life and raising its voltage by introducing on a grand scale certain elements of psychic arousal which in ordinary situations (social, economic and political) are inconspicuous, absent or latent.

To the first school the war-mind is passive in the grip of circumstances that inhibit the higher manifestations of human life or pervert them, simultaneously re-awakening and stimulating the lower manifestations. To the second school the war-mind is active and effervescent in response to opportunities afforded by those dramatic manifestations of life which evoke its high latencies. Given this scope for creative effort (argues this school), the mind is not only released from customary inhibitions and habits of routine; but further impassioned to high purpose and demiurgic activity.

May not both schools find common ground in searching out and studying situations of peace-time which call for the elements of the war-mind, both as to qualities and defects? Obvious instances of both are not far to seek. If lifeboat rescue and fire

brigade salvage be counted as episodal examples, yet may not the ordinary combating of disease by doctors and nurses, and of moral evils by priests and reformers be reckoned as illustrations which are in the run of custom? Is not the boy scout movement an endeavour to devise an education which combines and normalises into abiding habit, both the heroism of courage and the altruism of conscience? And if so, how far may the prodigious growth of this movement and its admitted successes be cited in evidence by the meliorist interpreters of the war-mind?

Again, take the defects of the war-mind as exemplified in peace-time. Are not these defects copiously illustrated in the records of crime and vice, the chronicles of folly, the accounts of insanity, and, above all, in the accumulating data of Freudian analysis? And if all such reversions and perversions be exceptional in fact, are they not, from the very nature of the case, symptomatic of the communities in which they germinate? Whatever else these evils be, are they not the flotsam and jetsam of communities embarked on a sea that is in process of being thoroughly charted? The course of such communities being mapped, do we not see them, since the Industrial Revolution, committed whole-heartedly to a *régime* of competitive industry, and, since the Renaissance, given unreservedly to emulative social practice?

May we not assume then that (to change the metaphor), these recurrent crops of reversions and perversions yielded by recent and contemporary societies in peace-time belong to the psychology of marginal survival, and if so, then they range themselves with cruder phenomena of the war-mind.

If the above assumptions are verifiable, then how far may we draw certain deductions? First, that the war-mind exhibits with the vivid outline of a diagrammatic object lesson, the tendencies and habits of the modern mind as it works in current western civilization. Second, that such a mind displays a twofold mode of interaction with its milieu; now passively recipient to environment and tradition, now impelled to mastery by the springs of vision. Is it not this tendency to an alternating sequence of negative and positive phases (as it were, the night and day of our inner world) which supplies the vital data of literature and religion? Do not the practitioners of these arts and disciplines of life see such mental phases crystallizing into habits, which in turn dissolve in a ferment of change and again recrystallize into new habits?

For that cycle of periodic movement a phrasing is needed in correspondence with the terminology of current psychology. May we not follow the practice, growing since the days of Hume, of describing the working of the mind in terms of habit; and declare that the normal tendency of the mind is towards Habituation, Dehabituation, Rehabituation? Yet, for the psychologist to say

that, is little more than to affirm that the mind ties, unties, and reties knots in the reins of life. It tells us nothing intimate about the rider and his steed, and their origin and destination. What deeper truths may be expected to emerge from study of the war-mind? From analyses of facts and tendencies are we not led inevitably, step by step, towards this more synthetic conception?—that the war-mind itself is not only a typical product of contemporary social evolution, but is a composite which embodies the very essence of the modern occidental mind, alike in its qualities and defects?

If that be so, does it not follow that for inmost revelation not only about the war-mind, but about mind itself, we must turn from psychology to sociology? Has not the central movement amongst psychologists themselves long been running in this direction? Do not their advanced workers find themselves to-day well within the sociological field? Their most recent school describes and explains mind in terms of "collective representations"; or, in other words, postulates a group-mind as in the main determining the individual mind. But that, it may be said, is a way of speaking which raises more questions than it answers. Doubtless; but may not the chief use of introducing phrasing that is specifically social be its implicit invitation to a wider co-operation in the investigation and research of mental problems. Does it not help, for instance, to bring into the discussion much needed aid from the psychological resources of literature and religion hitherto so little tapped for modern science? Is it not indeed the fact that the representatives of literature, poetry, drama are the real and essential vitalists of the psychological and social field? While, as for the theologians, does not their ancient formulation about the individual mind as an emanation of the divine mind, bear a certain genetic resemblance to the "collective representations" of the newest social-psychologists?

On the above or other lines of enquiry the Council begs to invite your written contribution to discussion, which the Society will devote to this study.

Yours faithfully,

I. C. J. FRASER DAVIES,

Secretary.

DEVOLUTION : A REGIONAL MOVEMENT.

A. PROVINCES IN GREAT BRITAIN.*

I.

WHILE the United Kingdom is divided for administrative purposes into three kingdoms and a principality, and these again into a number of counties, there have been times in which our rulers have felt the need of some divisions of intermediate size, which may fitly be termed provinces.

After the unification of England under Egbert, several of the kingdoms of the Heptarchy remained as Earldoms, some of which, e.g., Mercia and Northumbria, lasted until the Norman Conquest. In the south-east of England the approximate boundaries of some of the counties are of great antiquity; these counties are, for the most part, large in area, containing as a rule 1,000,000 acres or more, and in many cases they have been sub-divided for modern administrative purposes.

The sub-division into shires became gradually more common and before the time of the Confessor this system had become general throughout England. William the Conqueror organised his new possessions on this basis, and the County arrangement has remained in use, with some recent modifications, to our day. Nevertheless the need for some divisions of intermediate size was felt even in the Middle Ages. The King's escheators divided the kingdom into two provinces, *infra* and *citra* Trentam, while the same areas were used by the Chief Justices in Eyre for the Forest Pleas.

After the close of the Middle Ages there was a tendency to centralisation of administration, which, with certain exceptions, continued until the closing years of the nineteenth century. Oliver Cromwell, it is true, in 1655 divided the country into eleven commands for his Major-Generals, but as these divisions were made on political and party rather than on geographical lines, the system scarcely survived its founder. After the Restoration local administration revived, but remained in the hands of the Justices of the Peace, which meant the rule of the County families, and the Counties as units again increased in importance, and no further attempt at division into Provincial areas arose until quite recent times.

* A Report submitted to the Ministry of Reconstruction by a Sub-Committee appointed by the Standing Committee on "Regional Surveys and Local Studies" of The Geographical Association.

In the Middle Ages a national or traditional unification had developed on the English Plain, reaching out westward and northward as far as communications permitted and density of population made such unification important. With the Tudors the scheme of unification spread and its spread became more marked as communications developed, but the tendency was towards centralised control. The spread being gradual, London, as the old centre for the plain, took more and more of the country under its purview. The rise of industrialism has altered the distribution of population and has led to the growth of agglomerations almost comparable with London in what were formerly thinly peopled areas. The conditions have thus changed almost fundamentally, and this change of itself makes a reconsideration of administrative arrangements an urgent necessity.

The first modern partition was made by the military authorities who divided the country into four military commands and seven administrative districts. These areas have been changed more than once, but military necessity has dictated the policy of insuring a few large divisions of the country. Again for the purpose of agricultural education England and Wales have been divided into nine "provinces," each composed of a group of adjacent counties, and each connected with an agricultural college. Similar arrangements have also been made by the Post Office, and the Labour Exchange organisation.

Since the outbreak of war such provincial divisions have increased in number, and fresh divisions are rapidly coming into being. Thus we have administrative provinces for the Food Commissioners, Coal Commissioners, and Live Stock Commissioners, as well as for the Ministry of National Service. Doubtless many more such divisions are already in existence and a further number are likely to arise in the near future, for the Minister of Education has suggested the federation of local Education Authorities, which, if carried out, would result in the formation of a series of Educational Provinces, while it is understood that a further series is contemplated for the distribution of electric power. Similar provincial divisions will also be needed for the management of the water supply of our cities, for the control and improvement of our main arterial roads, and for town and regional planning.

The trend of events in recent years seems to indicate that the need for provincial areas will increase rather than diminish. Public administration is becoming more complex, and decentralisation of some kind seems to be a necessity. Counties are for many purposes too small, both in area and population, while their number has vastly increased in recent years. There are 40 Geographical Counties in England, but several of these, *e.g.*, Yorkshire, Lincoln-

shire, Northamptonshire, and Sussex have been sub-divided for administrative purposes, and there are now 50 administrative counties and 72 County Boroughs. The tendency has been, therefore, to increase the number and to diminish the area of the original counties, while, as we have endeavoured to show, for some purposes a need is being felt for divisions which shall be larger in size and fewer in number.

II

The suggestion for the organisation of Great Britain in provinces has its counterparts in other lands and notably in France, where there has been for some time a growing reaction against the administrative division of that country into a large number of artificial and uniform departments which in few cases represent natural unit areas. The regionalist movement in France aims broadly at the restoration of the larger and more "natural" provinces of pre-Revolutionary times, modified, however, to suit the social economic conditions of the present day. The change is being advocated both on grounds of administrative economy and of the importance of securing the greater co-operation which local patriotism is capable of supplying.

There is a similar movement in Spain, while it is noteworthy that "United Italy" has been careful to retain the historic administrative units of Tuscany, Piedmont, Lombardy, etc., which correspond in size and content very closely to the provinces which might be suggested for this country.

The British Empire too furnishes many examples of this type of division. In Canada the utility of the historic and natural division of the east into Quebec, Ontario, and the Maritime Provinces was recognised when the new western territories were carved out into large provinces like Manitoba and Alberta. Their boundaries, it is true, owing to the circumstances under which they were created, are often artificial, but they bear the same sort of relationship to Canada as a whole that the proposed provinces would bear to Britain, and they contain a large number of 'counties' as administrative sub-units. They correspond broadly to the natural economic divisions of Canada. The administrative divisions of Australia and South Africa are on similar lines, while those of New Zealand present a still closer parallel to what is proposed for Britain. New Zealand, with an area approximately equal to that of this country, is divided into nine major administrative units (four in the North, five in the South Island), determined mainly on geographico-economic grounds, *e.g.*, Westland and Canterbury. These again are sub-divided into counties. The fact therefore emerges that Britain is exceptional in basing her

administrative machinery on very small units such as most of our counties are, and that France, perhaps the only other great state with a system somewhat analogous to our own, is contemplating a change towards the provincial or regional method of administration.

III.

We see then that for certain administrative purposes the country is too large and the county too small. For other purposes, of course, the county itself is too large, while some urban and rural districts are too small—but this is a different though analogous problem. We have seen, too, that there is a tendency for various public administrative bodies to create provinces for their own use, while many athletic, railway, educational, scientific, professional and Trades Union organisations have pursued the same course, finding that by so doing they can manage their affairs with greater efficiency and economy of labour.

We may assume, therefore, that such provinces will become a permanent part of the organisation of the United Kingdom, and it remains to be decided whether (i) we may leave matters as they stand at present, each office creating its own series of provinces without reference to its colleagues, or (ii) whether we may consider the question as a whole, and evolve a coherent scheme.

i. We may, of course, let things slide and allow each authority to set up its own system, permitting the coal provinces to differ from the food provinces and the latter from those in use for other purposes. We may, in fact, attempt to "muddle through," if we are not yet tired of that untidy and expensive process. Complaint has often been made in the past, in the case of smaller areas, that Rural Districts do not coincide with Petty Sessional Divisions or Hundreds, and that an individual may reside in a dozen or more different areas for an equal number of purposes, for in some cases the geographic, parliamentary, administrative and registration counties have different boundaries. All this leads to considerable confusion and overlapping, while the majority of citizens are ignorant in which division they reside for any given purpose, or to what authority to appeal when in difficulties. It also makes certain types of accurate statistical work well-nigh impossible. What is true of these smaller areas will be equally true of the larger as they increase in number and become more effective.

ii. It is true that the functions of many of the provinces recently created are ephemeral, and we may expect many of them to disappear with the cessation of hostilities; nevertheless some will remain, and the experience gained during the years of war will lead to the formation of others. If, however, the tradition of disorder is permitted to survive the period of Reconstruction, there is a grave

danger that it will become permanent, for vested interests will arise which it will be difficult to eradicate.

It is possible, however, to consider the question as a whole and to evolve a coherent scheme once and for all: it is better to construct now than to face a further reconstruction in the near future. Among all the problems of Reconstruction now to be considered, none will be more helpful in the long run than a well-considered framework into which future activities can be fitted. The problem is fundamental, and it should not be impossible to design provinces, which shall be neither too small nor too numerous, and shall yet have sufficient homogeneity to act as real living units.

It might be thought that a coherent scheme is impossible, that the conditions which determine one set of provinces are different from those which determine another; but this is not really the case. The differences are fortuitous and due to what might be termed accidents were it not that they are at bottom due to the characteristic of 19th century British Government, which has allowed every one freedom or rather licence to do exactly as he liked. Each authority has been given a free hand. But fundamental conditions are common to all methods of division. The principles on which division is made must depend on these fundamental conditions whatever the particular end in view. Transport and lines of communication (actual or possible), the productive capacities of different areas and their characteristics (obvious or potential) are really the factors which have to be taken into account, especially if under the head of characteristics we include the characteristics of the population in number and habits.

It seems obvious that with the same fundamental conditions we should have the different sets of provinces not only generally similar but exactly the same. The advantages of a uniform scheme are obvious. Such a scheme is bound in all sorts of ways to aid administration or, at the least, not to hinder it as a cross division must certainly do. It must tend to simplicity and economy in management; there must be a corresponding saving of time and energy. It is fallacious to say that the purposes for which the provinces have been instituted are purely temporary and that it is not worth while to consider the matter, for anyone who has studied history or the world around him knows that this kind of thing is precisely that which tends to be perpetuated and to become worse with time because of the vested interests which arise.

But this is not all. A coherent scheme would not only have the mechanical advantages that we have enumerated, but it would offer, too, certain human aspects which should especially appeal to this country. The fact that we may reside in many different areas for as many different purposes undoubtedly hinders us from doing

our duty as citizens, for it destroys the sense of corporate unity with our neighbours which is fundamental to proper citizenship. The institution of new sets of confused and overlapping provinces will accentuate this defect.

It is not altogether desirable that each province should be homogeneous throughout, any more than that every man should be engaged in the same occupation. It is desirable, however, that each citizen in a given province should feel himself part of an organism. An essential condition of progress is a large measure of unity of consciousness among the inhabitants of an area, and this is destroyed by the present chaos. We believe, therefore, that for real progress both in administrative efficiency and economy, as well as in the production of the highest state of citizenship, a uniform system of provinces is essential.

If it be agreed that the time has come to divide Great Britain into administrative areas of provincial dimensions, and that such areas should be the same for all purposes, we must first inquire upon what bases such divisions should take place.

It has usually been taken for granted that such divisions should be as far as possible equal to one another, and the reasons for such a supposition are sufficiently obvious to need no elaboration, but there has been less unanimity when it comes to deciding whether this equality should be expressed in terms of area or population.

In a very valuable paper contributed to the *Geographical Journal* by Mr. C. B. Fawcett,¹ the writer has based his divisions on the distribution of population, saying that "no one province should be so populous as to be able to dominate the Federation." The question is important, and yet, if the provinces under discussion are to become a durable part of the administrative machinery of the country, it is well to remember that great shiftings in the relative density of the population have taken place in recent centuries, and that we have no guarantee that similar changes may not take place in the future; in fact, the suggested stations for the generation of electric power, and the readiness with which such power could be conveyed to a considerable distance seem likely to result in the development of industries far from the coal fields, with consequent changes in the distribution of the population.

Population is, therefore, an unstable basis for equality, though it must be admitted that coal-bearing regions and the environs of seaports will always attract a considerable population, while

1. "Natural Divisions of England," by C. B. Fawcett, *Geographical Journal* for February 1917. A volume called *Provinces of England* by the same writer, containing an amended scheme based on the same principles is included in the *Making of the Future Series*.

unproductive mountain regions are likely to remain sparsely peopled.²

1. We recommend, therefore, that an attempt be made to divide Great Britain into provinces, with areas not too diverse, except that provinces possessing important seaports or coal-bearing strata should consist of less, while those containing much apparently unproductive mountain or heath lands should consist of more, than the normal area. Each province should be of such an area that its parts have ready access to its vital centres.

If the areas of the provinces are not to be too diverse, we have next to determine their normal size. They should, we believe, be such as to secure good, and, as far as possible, self-contained regions, sufficiently large in area and content to justify self government on a big scale, but sufficiently small and linked up to have a distinct regional individuality.

There are three regions in Europe which, with but little change of boundary, have been distinct provinces throughout the greater part of the time during which we have any historic record; these are Wales, Brittany, and Tuscany. Their areas are, approximately: Wales 4,777,800 acres, with Monmouthshire 5,127,300 acres; Brittany 7,987,800 acres; Tuscany 5,954,560 acres.

They have the general character of hilly if not actually mountainous regions though Brittany lacks actual highlands, and, except in the case of Wales, they have no coal-bearing strata or commercial ports of the first magnitude. We may, therefore, take Wales as more nearly approaching the normal area required, realising that the areas of some of the English provinces might well be smaller, while in Scotland, with its sparsely peopled highlands, the area of each province might well be considerably greater. The four ancient Provinces of Ireland have areas varying from 4,228,200 to 5,965,500 acres.

2. We recommend, therefore, that the normal size of the province should be five million acres.

Mr. Fawcett, in the paper already quoted, has laid great emphasis on the fact that provinces should be based upon natural regions, and that boundaries should be drawn near watersheds; also that outlying areas should be in the same provinces as the centres to which they normally gravitate for business and other purposes. He suggests that boundaries should run through the most thinly populated areas, and states that "such divisions must to some extent supersede the ancient counties."

2. Far reaching alterations, following a more thoughtful use of the soil as well as the development of hydro-electric power, are nevertheless important considerations for the future. The spread of large-scale industry over the world may also react in many ways to diminish the present dominance of our existing highly specialized industrial aggregations.

On the other hand it has been pointed out that there are strong reasons why the historical divisions of the kingdom should not be changed. It is urged that for the sake of statistics, especially for population and production, the county divisions, which in England are historical and are the areas recognised and understood elsewhere, should be preserved at all cost. It is felt that the provinces should in most cases have a historical unity; they should be such as to appeal to the historic sense, actual or latent, of the people living in them. The maintenance and revival of regional traditions, as part of the inheritance of the citizens of the province and as an appeal to their local patriotism, is a factor which should count for a great deal, especially if we are to hope for a revival of craftsmanship. Where two districts, however, originally kept apart by natural circumstances, have grown into an economic unity in recent times, without impairing an older regional consciousness, the fact should be recognised in the division.

The provinces should not, it is suggested, be uniform in character throughout, but should have diversity within unity. We are suffering from over specialisation along particular lines in several administrative units. In other words a satisfactory province would be one which contained several *pays* or sub-regions, each with its distinctive individuality, but yet so related to one another as to form a natural whole. Every province, even when mainly industrial in character, should contain predominantly agricultural *pays*.

These various ideals seem at first sight to be incompatible, but after careful consideration we believe that a compromise could be effected which would preserve, to a great extent, what is essential to each. If the provinces were to consist of groups of counties, containing approximately the required acreage, we should have the historic continuity. If the boundaries of such groups were then rectified, to eliminate excrescences so as to avoid a too serrated margin, and such rectification followed the principles laid down by Mr. Fawcett, we should approximate to the ideal that he has put forward.

Lastly, if the areas thus removed from any county were such as were well-recognised units, such for instance as the Soke of Peterborough, and were never less than Registration Districts, the difficulties for statistical purposes would be reduced to a minimum. We feel that in any case such rectification should not be carried out without full inquiry and consultation with the populations concerned.

3. We would, therefore, recommend that the provinces consist of aggregates of counties, having approximately the normal area, but that, where necessary, the boundaries should be rectified. That in such rectification no Registration District be divided, that where

possible such new boundaries pass through thinly peopled areas, and that districts be attached to centres to which, whether from natural features or because of means of communication, they normally gravitate. And that before any such rectification is carried out the localities concerned should be consulted by a travelling Commission, who are empowered to hold inquiries at which local bodies and individuals can offer evidence.

We have considered the question of the actual aggregates of counties which should form the basis of the Provincial Division.

4. We recommend the following division for England and Wales :—

1. <i>The Metropolitan Provinces.</i>	Area.	Pop. (1911).
The counties of London, Middlesex, Surrey, Sussex, Kent, Essex and Hertfordshire	3,977,600	9,864,862
2. <i>Wessex.</i>		
The counties of Buckinghamshire, Oxfordshire, Berkshire, Hampshire, Wiltshire and Dorsetshire	3,964,900	2,150,496
3. <i>The West Country.</i>		
The counties of Gloucestershire, Somerset, Devon and Cornwall	4,382,800	2,221,923
4. <i>East Anglia.</i>		
The counties of Norfolk, Suffolk, Cambridgeshire, Huntingdonshire, Bedfordshire and Lincolnshire	5,058,500	1,905,375
5. <i>The Midlands.</i>		
The counties of Staffordshire, Derbyshire, Nottinghamshire, Leicestershire, Rutland, Northamptonshire, Warwickshire, Worcestershire, Herefordshire and Shropshire	3,664,400	3,406,266
6. <i>Lancastria.</i>		
The counties of Cumberland, Westmorland, Lancashire and Cheshire	3,329,500	6,051,932
7. <i>Northumbria.</i>		
The counties of Northumberland, Durham, and Yorkshire	5,830,300	6,046,717
8. <i>Wales.</i>		
Wales and Monmouthshire	5,127,500	2,420,921

There are certain rectifications of the boundaries of these provinces which occur at first sight, and which would tend at the same time to equalise the areas. That part of the Craven District

which lies west of the Pennines might be transferred from Northumbria to Lancastria, the Soke of Peterborough might be moved from the Midlands to East Anglia, while the south-eastern slopes of the Cotswolds might be attached to Wessex. Perhaps the northern districts of Essex would associate themselves rather with East Anglia than with the Metropolitan Province.

The Welsh border needs special consideration. Industrial Flintshire speaks English and its relation with the South Lancashire industrial area are developing. Portions of Shropshire and Herefordshire have intimate links with Wales. Some agricultural districts in the English-speaking part of Monmouthshire, not particularly related to the life of the South Wales coalfield, are said to desire closer association with England.

The problem of Scotland is more difficult, and the following suggestions are made with less confidence. Owing to the mountainous conditions of a great part of the country the population is small in comparison with the area, and seems likely to remain so. Under these circumstances it seems advisable that the provinces should be considerably greater in area than those in the southern part of the island.

5. We recommend, therefore, that Scotland be divided into two provinces, thus :—

9. *East Scotland.*

Area Pop. (1911).

The Shetland and Orkney Islands, and the counties of Caithness, Nairn, Elgin, Banff, Aberdeen, Kincardine, Forfar, Perth, Fife, Clackmannan, Kinross, Linlithgow, Edinburgh, Haddington, Berwick, Peebles, Selkirk, Roxburgh, and parts of the counties of Sutherland, Ross and Cromarty, Inverness, Stirling, and Dumfries	...	10,939,100	2,206,207
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10. *West Scotland.*

The counties of Argyll, Dumbarton, Bute, Renfrew, Ayr, Lanark, Kircudbright, Wigtown, and the remaining portions of the counties of Sutherland, Ross and Cromarty, Inverness, Stirling and Dumfries	8,130,100	2,574,699
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Scotland might be divided into east and west provinces, not unrelated to the historic archbishoprics of St. Andrews and Glasgow. These, or alternative suggestions, will be worked out in more detail in a further memorandum, if desired,

There remains only the question of Provincial Capitals. Mr. Fawcett has begun with these and has grouped some of his provinces around them. We have proceeded from the opposite end, and it is no easy matter, in some cases, to suggest which cities should be selected as the administrative centres. London, Birmingham and Bristol are fairly obvious, but in other provinces there is room for difference of opinion, and local jealousies are likely to arise between rival cities of almost equal size and importance.

We believe that there should be towns of contrasted types in each province, and regional centres representing different kinds of activities, rather than a single metropolis dominating the life of the provinces. For this reason we would suggest an alternative plan which might well be adopted in some instances. It is by no means obvious that there is an overwhelming advantage in a province possessing one centre, which shall be the capital for all its activities; there are, in fact, many arguments that may be used for dividing the responsibilities between two or more cities; some existing counties profit from this division of labour. Many of our cities are overgrown and have become so unwieldy that they cannot well provide adequate space for their population without driving it too far from this centre. If the focal point for the various activities of a province were divided among two or more centres, it would tend somewhat towards decentralisation within the province.

Thus, although London, from its size and historical importance as well as because it is the centre of the Empire, must remain for most purposes the Capital of the Metropolitan Province, the ecclesiastical centre of that province is likely to remain, where it has been for thirteen centuries, at Canterbury.

6. We do not make any definite recommendation on the subject of Capitals for the different provinces that we have defined, but we would suggest tentatively, by way of example, that in Wessex the administrative Capital might be at Winchester, the commercial or industrial Capital at Southampton, the intellectual or educational Capital at Oxford, and the ecclesiastical Capital at Salisbury.

H. J. PEAKE.

APPENDIX.

1. Schedule, showing in detail, the acreage and population (1911) of each province shown on Map 1.
2. Map showing the scheme for Provinces for England and Wales suggested in this report.
- 2a. Schedule showing in detail the acreage and population (1911) of each province shown on Map 2.

1a.

SUGGESTED PROVINCES IN ENGLAND AND WALES (C. B. FAWCETT).

Provinces.	Approximate Area in Sq. Miles.	Population at Census of 1911.	Suggested Capital.
The North Country...	5,360	2,598,426	Newcastle-on-Tyne.
Lancastria ...	4,280	6,286,459	Manchester.
Yorkshire ...	4,490	2,700,111	Leeds.
Peakdon ...	900	1,197,976	Sheffield.
Severn ...	5,080	2,821,450	Birmingham.
Trent ...	4,780	2,133,315	Nottingham.
Devon ...	4,020	1,016,988	Plymouth.
Wessex ...	2,940	1,138,355	Southampton
Bristol ...	3,060	1,295,161	Bristol.
East Anglia ...	4,980	1,221,108	Norwich
London ...	6,390	10,097,323	London.
Central England ...	4,290	1,178,273	Oxford.
Wales ...	7,760	2,385,547	Cardiff.

2a.

The Metropolitan Province.

	Area.	Pop. (1911).
London ...	74,800	4,521,685
Middlesex ...	148,700	1,126,465
Surey ...	461,800	845,578
Sussex ...	932,400	663,378
Kent ...	975,900	1,045,591
Essex ...	979,500	1,350,881
Hertfordshire ...	404,500	331,284
	<hr/> 3,977,600	<hr/> 9,864,862

Wessex.

	Area.	Pop. (1911).
Buckinghamshire ...	479,300	219,551
Oxfordshire ...	480,600	199,269
Berkshire ...	462,300	271,009
Hampshire ...	1,053,000	950,579
Wiltshire ...	864,100	286,822
Dorset ...	625,600	223,266
	<hr/> 3,964,900	<hr/> 2,150,496

The West Country.

			Area.		Pop. (1911).
Gloucestershire	805,800	736,097
Somerset	1,037,600	458,025
Devon	1,671,300	699,703
Cornwall	868,100	328,098
			<hr/> 4,382,800	<hr/> 2,221,923

East Anglia.

Norfolk	1,315,000	499,116
Suffolk	948,200	394,060
Cambridgeshire	553,200	198,074
Huntingdonshire	302,900	55,577
Lincolnshire	1,705,300	563,960
			<hr/> 5,058,500	<hr/> 1,905,375

The Midlands.

Staffordshire	744,900	1,348,259
Derbyshire	650,300	683,423
Nottinghamshire	504,100	604,698
Leicestershire	532,700	476,553
Rutland	97,200	20,346
Northamptonshire	638,600	348,515
Warwickshire	580,700	1,040,409
Worcestershire	479,200	526,087
Herefordshire	538,900	114,269
Shropshire	861,800	264,307
			<hr/> 5,664,400	<hr/> 5,408,266

Northumbria.

Northumberland	1,291,500	696,893
Durham	649,200	1,369,860
Yorkshire, East Riding	750,200	432,759
" North Riding	1,362,200	419,546
" West Riding	1,773,500	3,045,377
York, City of	3,700	82,282
			<hr/> 5,830,300	<hr/> 6,046,717

Lancastria.

	Area.	Pop. (1911).
Cumberland	973,000	265,746
Westmorland	505,300	63,575
Lancashire	1,194,900	4,767,832
Cheshire	656,300	954,779
	<hr/> 3,329,500	<hr/> 6,051,932

Wales.

Anglesey	176,600	50,928
Brecknockshire	469,300	59,287
Cardiganshire	443,200	59,879
Carmarthenshire	588,400	160,406
Carnarvonshire	366,000	125,043
Denbighshire	426,000	144,783
Flintshire	163,000	92,705
Glamorganshire	518,800	1,120,910
Merionethshire	422,300	45,565
Montgomeryshire	510,000	53,146
Pembrokeshire	393,000	89,960
Radnorshire	301,100	22,597
Monmouthshire	349,500	395,719
	<hr/> 5,127,500	<hr/> 2,420,921

B.

EUROPEAN ASPECTS.*

The industry and the politics of the nineteenth century progressed alike through extension and unification. Larger industries, further-reaching and swifter transports, wider markets, became naturally also associated over greater areas, and these into larger unities of administration and government. Railways and telegraphs, steamer-routes and cables at once enlarged industrial towns to world-markets, and aggrandized their metropolitan cities into imperial capitals. Practical life and political endeavour were thus at one; hence the expansion of England, the centralization of France, the American War of Union, the unification of Germany, and even of Italy, are now seen as kindred processes.

Exceptions to these processes, even dissents from them, were noticeable. But these were simply explained, in terms of limitation, or backwardness; *e.g.* geographical for Switzerland, linguistic for Hungary, sentimental for Alsace and Lorraine, legendary for Ireland, and so on; and thus as so many survivals, destined to disappear with progress or education, or at worst as petty self-assertions, to be repressed with such firmness as need be. The sun of Progress shone essentially from the ever-growing capitals over their extending empires, and illuminated the unification of their nationalities, under due predominance of their metropolitan types.

Yet, despite Vienna and Austria, Hungary achieved her equality in empire; and thus diffused a more European influence and example than she knew. The separation of Norway from Sweden was a more peaceful case of this process, albeit a more extreme one: and now, after the war, we see not only the conservation of the small nations, but the rise of new ones—witness the complete break-up of Austria into its units, the reunion of Poland, the disintegration of "all the Russias," and the growing detachment of German States from Berlin and Prussia. The decentralization of "all the Spains" from Madrid is also under active discussion; and, most significant of all, it is from France, though the earliest and most fully centralized of countries, and most unanimous of all throughout the war, that we have longest been receiving alike the best descriptions of her component regions and the most definite projects of legislation towards their renewal. "Regionalism" was, indeed, first a French word: and this not merely in geography, but also in politics, and long before the war. From Brittany to

* The Editors' introduction to "Provinces of England" a volume by C. B. Fawcett just issued in the "Making of the Future" series.

Provence its studies and its policy have long been preparing; and now still more definitely with the return of Alsace and Lorraine. The United Provinces of France are thus in the remaking.

For most of the older generation, whether industrial and liberal, or of imperialist and financial outlooks, this newer movement has seemed reactionary or perverse, and of course not always without cause. Yet as students of social life and its processes we are learning to recognize that every society is a complex web, with its relatively fixed geographical and historic conditions, its regional warp, as the very basis of its fluent economic and political woof. Economics is thus fundamentally regional, since sources of food, materials, and power, conditions of transport and more, are of Nature's making, which we utilize more than we modify. Hence, since politics cannot but follow economic lines, it has to become inter-regional as well; not simply super-regional—*i.e.* uni-regional, if not positively irregional—as metropolitan bureaucracies are increasingly felt by their external provinces to be. So far as the war settlement and the League of Nations are recognizing these conditions and dual requirements, the regional and the general, their work may thus be effective, and become stable; or conversely.

Hence this new movement, towards regionalism, and all over Europe, despite the impatience, or even excesses, with which it may be chargeable, is by no means the mere mental disorder or material revolt so alarming to the metropolitan view-point; since its inmost purpose is not the disruption of larger ties, so far as vital ones, but the legitimate development of the local life; which has been at best but insufficiently fostered, if not positively repressed, from distant centres substantially unacquainted with it. As the first claims of this regional life are granted, inter-regionalism cannot but be advanced anew: hence the most discerning, and therefore most intensive regionalists of to-day are also among the most appreciative of truly comprehensive politics, as of the League of Nations. Though the embers and sparks which actually kindled the war were largely from among the Balkan peoples, in their long ill-centralized and still unadjusted regions, it is the well-adjusted cantons of Switzerland, with their different races, languages, and religions, their varied yet mutualized sympathies and interests accordingly, and the United Provinces of Holland and of Belgium, the Scandinavian peoples, and of course the United States, which are leading the Great Powers into that League of which they have each so long been samples and examples, in their various ways.

So indeed it is for the British Empire, for which the crude separatism of one generation, and the crude centralization attempted by the next, have in ours been reconciled through wise and large measures of devolution; and with increasing moral solidarity accordingly as the war has so vividly shown. Why not then the

like in our own islands? Ireland's predominant demands is not their only difficulty, nor yet Ulster's more exasperated regionalism. Wales, for matters of church, education, etc., Scotland too for her own concerns, and also North England, the Midlands, and more, are all claiming more understanding, and affirming more urgency, for their own affairs, than an over-worked central government can give them.

Hence then the need of regional geography ; and for this survey, this necessary description and diagnosis before treatment, England offers one of the best of fields, the more so since undivided in language or sentiment.

REBUILDING THE FRENCH BATTLE ZONE.

WHEN I left Paris recently for a visit to the battle-fields of France, Belgium and Flanders, I had two or three reasons for wishing to see this latest processional of Death. I wanted to see the actual condition of the battle-zone, what had been and was being done to clear it, the lines upon which resurrection was taking place, whether it rested on a clear, defined economic and social policy, and if so the aims, actuality and possibility of this policy. Above all, I was curious to see how the returning native re-established himself among the ruins. I decided to take an indefinite path, to drift here and there, on foot or on an army lorry, over the wide surface of the panorama representing the funeral of agricultural and industrial France and Belgium, and to extract as I went facts and figures suited to my general plan.

I had not got ten miles on my road to Albert before I found that the actual conditions of the battle-zone varied considerably. This made it possible to divide it into three. The entire battle-zone is said by a reliable authority to cover 4,844,000 hectares of which 3,633,000 hectares were under cultivation. The heavily-fought over area was about 1,225,000 hectares, of which nearly a million were agricultural. About 122,500 hectares have been reduced to dust. Important districts like Ypres, Lens, Albert, La Bassée, Dixmude have been completely destroyed. Others, like Arras, are inhabited, but have only two or three houses intact. Arras has two. The rest are wrecks. The bedroom I occupied was open to the sky, and through the hole I could see in the moonlight the ghosts of vegetation that had grown on the roof since the town was first attacked. Hundreds of villages have been swept flat. In one place, near Roulers, I think, I counted sixteen heaps of fine dust that were villages once upon a time. Here and there a village that once crowned a hill has been cut clean off together with several feet of the hill, so that no remains of it are to be found. Throughout this area the soil has been rendered useless. It is shattered, poisoned, pitted with craters and shell-holes, pierced with trenches, honeycombed with tunnels, sown with mines and booby-traps, and densely planted with millions of fragments of iron, stones and cement. Hills have been levelled, forests cremated, waterways dammed, altered and polluted, bridges mined and railways torn up.

Then there is the lightly fought-over area of some 800,000 hectares. The country between Paris and Creil is an excellent sample. First comes stretches of undulating cornfield, then pastures and fields churned up by the long distant guns, then the

trenches nearest Paris, then districts strewn with telegraph and telephone wreckage, the remains of railway and aeronautical material, and the stocks and stones which have been concentrated at different points near Paris in an effort to stop the enemy's last advance. So the panorama unfolds of agricultural land committed to sudden defence and a subsoil rendered temporarily useless by shell-shock and lumber.

The third area of some 2,560,000 hectares, with nearly two millions under cultivation, has been occupied by the Germans almost throughout the war. The greater part of the soil is untouched, indeed it has been kept under cultivation. The effect produced by these variations is that of a vast battle-zone, resembling a carpet of many patches, and one passes constantly from the havoc and sensation of war to beautiful fertile tracts where the stunned spectator may breathe and recover as in a temple of meditation. I remember leaving Lille by army lorry for a hundred miles run to Mons and beyond. It was late noon on a brilliant summer's day. I was saturated with a vision of the black blush I had just seen on the ruined faces of Ypres, Armentieres and Bailleul. In Lille itself there had been the sight of a shell-shocked city core, and of an industrial and commercial centre striving to rid itself of the mark of occupation which the Germans had set upon the lintel and two side posts of the houses, as the Israelites had set the mark of blood upon theirs. We crossed the canal by an improvised bridge, and for a mile or two jolted through a chill, grey and desolate suburb. Then came a burst of gold-dust noon touched with splashes of cornflower blue, and for many a mile we skirted cornfields flashing across the open to fade in distant shadowy hills, and foreground orchards and pastures packed with fragrant hay. Every now and again a contented red-roofed village or a stone-grey factory swiftly rode in and out of sight. In the first hour or so of the journey I did not see a sign of war. I might indeed have been riding along one of England's western roads. Then came damaged Touraine, and war destruction flashed up again. In my experience it is not correct to say that this particular and very extensive district has suffered from enemy occupation. In some respects it has benefited. Every house along the Lille-Mons road is methodically numbered in large white figures, and each bears the billet and air-raid accommodation in German. There is an improved system of sign-posts that makes it impossible for a traveller to go astray. Huge boards containing the names of towns, villages, directions, distances, and places en route in bold white characters are displayed at frequent intervals on prominent buildings, so that a motorman can find his way at full speed. These sign-posts are all over the vast battle-field, and it may be said that the war has practically re-directed Europe for the tourist.

Beyond Touraine the country has suffered from the demands made upon it by the Germans who have cut down large quantities of valuable timber, while houses have been damaged by the Allied air-raids. But poverty-stricken industrial Jemappes, where the brunt of the Mons fighting fell, was as busy as a bit of our own Black Country, while Mons had nothing more to show of its badge of servitude than a town carefully numbered for military occupation. Like other war towns it had a vast dump of lorries. This completely filled the long broad avenue that skirts the railway.

Everywhere I went there were dumps, from the wonderful dust heaps of cathedrals and Town-halls like that of Arras, which is to be preserved as a war memorial, to wire heaps. There were enemy dumps and Allied dumps, mountains of unused material like the German stuff on the Vimy Road, and the material that represented the increasing flow of salvages from the battlefield like the sixteen-mile dump at Calais. It meant that clearing up was in full swing. Clearing up! The land must be cleared up before rebuilding can start. The wounds of the soil to which the French are passionately attached must be healed before the new life can express itself. Only those persons who visit the battle-zone can realise what this means. If they go now after eleven months of armistice what will they find? Simply that many large areas upon which salvage troops have been continuously working still look untouched. Take Lens and Vimy Ridge for instance. Large bodies of men have been toiling here for months past, yet there never was on earth a district so heavily littered with ruin, rubbish, refuse and war material of all kinds. The Ridge itself, the wide flat country it overlooks, and the road approaches with their unequalled system of above and underground defences, have received millions of shells and bombs during the last four years. Added to this, there are tons and tons of light railways, equipment, wire entanglements, and other fighting material. There are solid steel and cement "pill boxes," that must be blown up to be removed. Moreover in such a gas-shelled district as this, the Germans were driven literally underground with the result that they built miles and miles of subways, that resemble the Paris or London tube system, by which armies were moved underground. And they built dug-outs 80 feet below the surface, containing complete houses. I slept in one of these houses and dreamt I was in a Garden Suburb Villa. But the first morning I tried to find my way to the bathroom I nearly fell down the water-well which the architect had placed in the centre of the kitchen. Then there are systematic destructions like the sixteen coal mines at Lens. These are now a mass of bent and twisted girders and other debris, and will take at least ten years to restore. And there are systematic accumulations of rubbish. At Aniche and Saint Quentin, which were occupied by the

Germans, every house has a room systematically stored with rubbish. It is estimated there is a quarter of a million cubic metres of rubbish stored in 15,000 houses waiting to be removed. Of course towns like these, and indeed most of the battle-zone districts are overrun with vermin that will take years to clear out. The clearing up is proceeding methodically. I noticed several narrow gauge railways at work. The Royal Engineers, Allied labour troops, black and yellow labourers, and German prisoners were being employed on salvage work. The latter are now being sent home, but 400,000 German volunteers are ready to do salvage work. The repatriation of prisoners has revived the difficult question of immigration.

I saw nothing important of actual rebuilding unless the re-fronting of houses at Ostend and the re-roofing of others at Dunkirk can be called rebuilding. It is doubtful whether rebuilding has begun in the devastated regions. It is true there are no end of plans waiting to be carried out. But those plans have very little relation to each other, and it is quite evident that France has no definite rebuilding policy. For the moment the battle-zone is the happy hunting ground of anyone who is willing to undertake rebuilding. Foreigners of all kinds are seeking to stake out claims, and benevolent societies, journalistic architects, speculative builders, profiteers, English contractors who have signed on for a term of years, as it were, are in active competition with one another. One big firm of contractors has started on the outskirts of the battle-zone, and expects to reach the bad places in a few years from now. Once I was very near to work that is being carried out by the English Society of Friends, who are rebuilding forty villages in a harp-shaped sector of Verdun. I did not go to examine it. I knew the Society had done useful war-time work in providing war victims with shelters and tools, for I had seen the temporary huts erected at Semaize, Fairesse, Villers-aux-Vents and elsewhere on the Marne, but I had not discovered that the Society was qualified to plan and build Garden Cities on a large scale. It seemed to me that French regionalists were the proper persons to superintend the rebuilding of France. If the individual is the product of the environment, surely environment should be the product of the individual, and not foreign deputies. In any case, the work of rebuilding, as planned by the Society of Friends, did not reveal the hand of the master-builder whom one expects to spring fully armed, so to speak, from the ashes of ruined France, ready to perform the miracle of re-creating the regional life of this country in a form more deeply French than ever. Indeed, all the Society aimed at was:—

- (1) To accommodate returning families.
- (2) To survey the topographical possibilities of certain districts.

- (3) To organise building resources in money, material and men, and
- (4) To rebuild.

In short, their main object was to get the houses together and to set families going in as pleasant surroundings as financial circumstances would admit. Several pressing fundamental problems appeared to be overlooked. For instance, one wondered how the important question of the re-division of the land was to be dealt with. Thousands of morsels have been knocked out of all recognition. What is to take the place of the impossible morcellement system imposed by the Code Napoleon?

A great deal of sociological interest attaches to the unaided return of the natives. The French are fundamentally a peasant race, and the French peasant is passionately attached to his own particular region of France. No doubt this accounts for the fact that refugees are eager to return to their own Communes, towns and villages, and in fact are doing so in great numbers, without waiting to have accommodation provided for them. Anyone who likes may watch the sociological process of individuals rebuilding their environment and passing from a comparatively primitive stage to a more complex civilised one. The new centres of communal life in ruined towns like Ypres and Lens, where between two and three thousand natives have re-established themselves in cellars, and dug-outs, and self-made shelters, are the *estaminets* or taverns. There are a great many of these wooden shacks which the returning native has built to serve the double purpose of private accommodation and public entertainment. In a public way, they take the place of the municipal and other public institutions blown to bits during the war, and more than one of them is a general stores, post-office, café, social centre, club, and a lot more things rolled into one. Of course, civilised people require a great deal of ingenuity and invention to adapt themselves to an environment that lacks the ordinary conveniences of modern social life, proper lighting, water supply, sanitation, transport, and so on. This ingenuity and adaptiveness are becoming visible in the ruined towns that I mention, which are full of touches of character and personality, not to be found in towns that are being rebuilt by strangers.

A train crammed with soldiers—I seemed to be always riding about in trains or other vehicles crammed with soldiers or sailors—took me to Brussels one day. I hoped to learn a great deal about the reconstruction of Brussels from the Union Internationale de Villes. But although this Association was busy organising a civic exhibition to be opened a few weeks later, no information of importance was forthcoming. The exhibition itself had only reached the poster stage. What impressed me most about Brussels

was the "dear life." A hotel garret cost 15 francs a night, and a fragment of steak, that might as it were slip into one's hollow tooth and get lost, cost 10 francs. I wondered how visitors to the Exhibition were likely to fare, and I suggested to M. Emile Vinck that prices should be made lighter for Press and other representatives. But I do not think it has been done. I am afraid that visitors suffering from the pangs of being reft of their ready cash are not likely to bear the happiest memory of Brussels, and its enterprising exhibition.

I would like to say here that I am deeply obliged to Sir George Riddel of the British Delegation, Paris, Captain Praux, Chief of the Press Bureaux, Cercle Francais de la Presse Etrangère, and La Maison de la Presse, for assisting me to obtain certain permits; I have also to thank the English officers of 129 P.O.W. Company, Lens, Captain Ellis, Lieut. L. Davas, and Lieut. J. A. C. Morrison, for the courtesy of hospitality that enabled me to remain some days at Lens.

HUNTLY CARTER.

ENQUIRY INTO ECONOMIC REGIONALISM IN FRANCE.

ORGANIZED BY HUNTLY CARTER.

The following replies are the result of an attempt to discover the opinions of a certain number of distinguished French economists and regionalists on the question of national and local autonomy.*

The questions submitted for their consideration were as follows:—

1. Is the world-wide movement towards national and local autonomy desirable?
2. Do you think that the war, and the idea of national autonomy has had any influence on economic and industrial regionalism in France?
3. If so, what influence from the theoretical point of view?
What influence from the practical point of view?
4. Would a lasting peace be more likely if the nations were organised on an autonomous basis?

The following note was also added:—There are two further questions implied in the Questionnaire on which you may wish to express an opinion.

As regards question 2.

Could you quote some examples of regionalist independence in France amounting to a synthesis of regional life?

As regards question 3.

How far, do you think, the defeat of Germany will permit of a willing surrender of central power so far as Paris is concerned, supposing that such a centralisation was only an inevitable defence against German aggression?

M. PIERRE DE MAROUSSEM.

President of the Society of Social Economics and Union for Social Peace.

(1) We believe it to be desirable, and in any case it is impossible to prevent it. The awakening of individualism amongst the most advanced of the rich and prosperous nations has led to what is called "The Liberal Movement"; and as an almost necessary counterpart, the Liberal Movement has brought in its train, that of Nationalities.

Within the most solidly united nations, on the other hand, the memory of the little nationalities, gradually incorporated in the course of history, must manifest itself similarly:—this manifestation is called "Regionalism."

(2) The fact is undeniable.

(3) These two points of view are indistinguishable. To convince oneself of this it is only necessary to re-capitulate the history of what is called Regionalism in France from the Declaration of War in 1914. Immediately after the opening of hostilities the Ministry of War transformed the areas, from which the Army Corps were drawn, into economic areas, and this with a view to re-vitalizing them. A Department for this purpose has been set up in Rue St. Dominique.

* When I speak of "National autonomy" I mean what is called in English "Home Rule," that is to say a country considered as a self-sufficient entity. It is assumed that each country should be governed in its own way, and even each part of the country. (e.g., Switzerland).

Shortly afterwards the Ministry of Commerce tried to divide France into a certain number of purely economic Regions, using the information derived from the researches of the *Federation Regionaliste Française*, and of the *Ligue pour la Representation professionnelle* of M. Jean Hennessy. M. Hauser, Professor of the Faculté de Dijon, is responsible for this Department of the Ministry of Commerce. With the aid, especially, of the map published on the 12th of October, 1916, by the *Exportateur Française*, and after consultations with the Chambers of Commerce, whose assistance he sought, he endeavoured to make a fresh re-division which grouped the departments into 16 Regions, (see the map published by the *Excelsior* in April, 1919). However, after the Armistice a very clear Regionalistic movement showed itself in re-conquered Alsace and Lorraine. The efforts attempted in this direction have been emphasised by the Congress of the Société of Social Economics in June, 1919.

On the other hand, the invaded departments of the region of the Nord, finding that economic reconstitution did not act sufficiently quickly under the direction of the centralised administrations, organised the States General of the devastated provinces.

The idea that centralisation complicates questions, and does not resolve them grows more and more.

(4) The size of the autonomous regions does not seem to have a direct influence on the chance of a lasting peace. Old Europe, divided into innumerable little principalities was always at war. The concentration in great states has led to the catastrophes from which we are emerging.

Nevertheless, the experience of humanity seems to show that little nations are less subject to corruption than great ones, and consequently bring about less easily the great convulsions of history which bring in their wake so much bloodshed and so many tears. If disciplined, above all, by a well-conceived League of Nations, and cemented by frequent interchanges, they would perhaps lead to a General European Confederation, which, in theory, would be desirable, although the realisation could not be expected for long years to come.

PROFESSOR HENRI HAUSER.

Correspondent of the *Institute*. Professor at the Sorbonne and at the National Conservatoire of Industrial Arts.

I. I think it is vain to ask oneself if the movement towards national autonomy is, or is not, desirable. It might be possible that the opposite movement—that which seems to drag humanity towards the effacement of different national characteristics—would be more desirable. But facts are facts. The war showed cruelly the danger—in all that touches the essential elements in production—for a people to depend upon other peoples, as the economic condition of war, will not disappear with peace, but will prolong itself as long as the rarefaction of work and matters and raw material: no theory can prevail against necessity for people who desire to live at all, to give an autonomous base to their national economics.

Regarding the movement which is manifesting itself in many lands—as in France,—the United Kingdom, Belgium—in favour of regional autonomy, it seems to me desirable in every way. These states will have after-war problems and needs which will be terribly difficult to solve and to satisfy. If their central governments determine to arrange all these matters themselves by means of centralised administration they will not be able to accomplish the task. Nothing will be done, or at best there will be deplorable delay. Only the regional authorities who are in close touch with men and their work, know the real needs of the population, and in what these differ from the neighbouring population's needs. They alone

can rapidly take decisions upon matters as they arise, find the resources necessary, arouse enthusiasm in local groups for work which is of collective interest.

The central executive and legislative powers should not intervene except to harmonise the aspirations of the divers regions—to avoid or set right any conflicts, keep certain regions from seeing *only* their own interests—in short to maintain the meaning of a superior rational unity. But the central executive should not have the responsibility for the affairs of these regions. Economically, the nation should be constituted as a Limited Company divided into several branches, each branch having its committee of administration. Above each of these committees would sit the central committee, representing the general interests of the Company.

II. The war has certainly had an effect upon the economic regionalism of France, and this for several reasons:

- (a) In August-September, 1914, a large part of the regions of France, (without speaking of the invaded regions) found themselves more or less cut off from their relations with the capital, towards which they were in the habit of turning. During a certain time they had reason to believe that their capital would be occupied by the enemy. Bordeaux, become the political and administrative capital could not, in spite of its importance, replace Paris as economic capital. The regions—those which the Parisians, with inexact and dangerous generalisation, call the Provinces—the regions were forced to be self-supporting, and, with the neighbouring localities, maintain national life. The result was a marvellous work of spontaneous organisation, in which the municipalities collaborated with the local assemblies, chambers of commerce, Trade Unions, associations, etc., and these combined really saved France. Such a life was an education, and the men who have lived and made life possible in those tragic times will be less than ever disposed to receive orders from, and put up with the delays of central administration.
- (b) The imperious necessity of industrial war has enormously developed existing local centres and created new ones. The temporary disappearance of the industries of the valley of the North and North East has strengthened, for example, the industries of the valley of the Rhone, and of the Alps, and has caused all sorts of new industrial regions to be set up—such as that of the Pyrénées. Because of this necessity several sleepy and monotonous, lazy districts have come to life, and immense factories have brought with them a working population—who will not forget all this.
- (c) Even the determination of the war brings to economic regionalism two powerful arguments: first, Alsace, for nearly fifty years outside the French community, can only participate usefully now in the national life of France if her peculiarities are respected, and if her special situation and interests are considered; she gives to the rest of France a chance for experimenting with regionalism.

Secondly, the re-conquered territories are in such a condition that it seems as if rapid reconstruction is impossible, if people wish to set about this by the ordinary centralised means. It is not possible at this moment—and it will not be possible for a long time,—to act at Lille and at Arras as at Nantes and at Toulouse. People will find out no doubt, in a few years that some of the experience gained at Lille, and at Arras, and at Strasbourg may be useful at Toulouse and at Nantes.

Are there in France recent examples of regional autonomy?

During the war, it was the central power itself which—by the creation of consultative committees, over economic action, set up in military regions—made the

authorities, the assemblies and the local groups combine over collective responsibilities. Since then it has been by the advice of Chambers of Commerce that the Minister Clementel conceived his plan of organisation in economic regions.

Several of these regions have already shown vitality by useful developments: for example, in the region of Marseilles—the setting up of an office of regional activities at Nancy, an Institute of Mineralogy and Metallurgy at Caens, a commercial Institute, elsewhere to set up Museums of samples, etc.

Whatever may be the future reserved for the administrative conception of the Ministry of Commerce the movement will not stop now. It is without danger from the point of view of national unity, because neighbouring regions tend already, by arrangements between themselves, to serve the general interest—for instance take the arrangements in the Rhone districts from the triple point of view of agricultural irrigation, of power, and of navigation. The same question will come for the Rhine.

These are the types of public works that central administration, with methods necessitating delays, would be impotent to manage, and it is here that regional action, and inter-regional relations make it possible to move.

III. The conquest of Germany certainly makes Parisian centralisation appear less indispensable, because it was thought essential to maintain the system until the arrival of peace. Nevertheless it will not be possible to renounce completely the system, even though peace has arrived; and in consequence centralisation cannot be quite replaced—while it appears that Germany, in spite of exterior transformation has only removed by word and not by deed her old ideas of domination. The setting up—and that by the will of the Allies themselves, in the heart of Europe of an army of 100,000 non-commissioned officers, (100,000 Junkers,) and the imperfections of the military clauses in the covenant of the League of Nations, do not permit us, even with the guarantee of Great Britain and America, to renounce our military security. We are obliged to guard in good working condition an instrument for quick mobilisation, and this instrument must be manœuvred from the centre.

IV. It is very difficult to know, whether, or no, national economic autonomy would make possible a lasting peace. Theoretically, it seems as if economic autonomy would rather have the effect of setting the nations at each others' throats.

On the other hand, economic inter-dependence arising from geographic divisions and from work between nations should make for mutual and peaceful inter-relations. Unfortunately facts do not conform to theory. Certain nations, if they do not assure themselves of an economic autonomy, soon find themselves *vis à vis* with other nations in a state of economic vassalage which they find insupportable. From this comes friction and wars will be generated.

Peace seems to be seen more in the contact of divers national autonomies, which, by reason of not being entirely self-sufficient, will have need of one another. One can, in the name of a superior doctrine, misinterpret this conception of reciprocal exchange of services, and treat it as mere glorification of trade, turning it into a "bargaining policy." But it is by bargaining of this sort that people learn that they cannot do without each other, they realise their mutual solidarity.

There would not be room, in appearance, for national autonomies in a world where the economic warriors should be completely done away with, and where reigned absolute commercial equality. But what would be the real consequences of such a regime as the latter? As one cannot abolish the existing inequalities between nations,—on account of position, soil, climate, culture, history, financial situation,—this false equality ends in the crushing of the weak. Moreover, each people dreads in regard to each article produced, one rival more than all the rest. If, in the name of absolute commercial equality, each had the sole right to

make the tariff, which pleased it, but there must be only one tariff, the same for all, we should arrive, without choice, at establishing for each one of the articles under consideration, the highest duties which could guarantee against the most formidable competitor. A maximum duty would be, *ipso facto*, laid upon all other competitors. The Tariff of each nation would thus be composed of maximum duty. To all enemies, we should apply a very hard treatment, which we might call the treatment of the most disfavoured nation. The notion of commercial equality, like all absolute notions, is contrary to the nature of things, which is relative. It is contrary to economic equity, a quite relative notion. The inevitable consequence would be that all peoples would be forced to adopt extreme protective tariffs, exaggerated protection: war of tariffs is a cause of war.

The future seems rather to belong far more to distinct national autonomies, negotiating freely one with another in a reciprocal base. Thus these would form among themselves varied and numerous ties, guarantees of mutual goodwill. The need and the habit of talking, negotiating, giving and taking advantages, have always been the conditions for maintaining peaceful relations between nations as between men. As it has been in the past it will be in the future.

The more the nations feel themselves autonomous,—that is to say capable of assuring for themselves by their own methods the first necessities of existence—the less they will fear being dominated, subjected to other nations, and the more they will be disposed to negotiate with them on an equal footing as regards Tariff, in a true spirit of peace.

PROFESSOR CHARLES BRUN.

University of Paris. General Delegate of the French Regional Federation.

1. I should deny all that I have said or written for more than twenty years if I did not say I thought that the movement towards international (world-wide) and local autonomy, in the terms of your Questionnaire, excellent and eminently desirable. The founders of the French Regionalist Federation, amongst whom I have the honour to be, have never hidden the fact that they are convinced supporters of regional autonomy.

2. The war has been a bad thing, but this great evil may also bring a great blessing as a result. The poet Mistral loved to say "The devil carries stone," meaning thereby that it was possible to make profitable use of even diabolical enterprises. The cataclysm from which we are just emerging with serious injuries, has contributed to develop somewhat the tendencies towards regional autonomy everywhere. It is not in vain that we have, for four whole years, preached the crusade of right, and proclaimed the principle of self-determination for the peoples. In recognising this principle for nationalities enslaved by their enemies the powers of the Entente have entered into a tacit engagement with regard to their own national and regional problems.

M. de l'Estourbeillon, deputy of Vannes, and head of the Breton Regionalist Union, has pointed out, when submitting an interesting request to the Peace Conference, that it would be sufficient to substitute the word "French" for the word "German," (in relation to the teaching of languages in the treaty imposed on Austria), in order to make the Bretons, the Basques and the Languedociens satisfied.

If we pass to pure Regionalism, that is to say to the improvement of French regions by a decentralised administrative organisation, and by a specialised economic organisation, we cannot deny that the war has brought about considerable progress. The necessity for creating purely military industries, of replacing imports, (almost all our chemical industry was in the hands of Germany), of utilizing all the resources of our soil and sub-soil, inevitably turned French production

towards the Regionalist idea. In fact, Paris was so much threatened as to cease to be the sole economic capital of France: great economic centres have been created, like Lyon, Grenoble, Marseilles, Nantes. The boundaries of the economic regions round them have settled themselves. (The same phenomenon is now occurring round Strasburg and Lille. The liberated districts are the most earnest to claim their autonomy). The government, far from combating this tendency, seems disposed to favour it. It created during the war regional economic councils, adopting the boundaries of army corps areas for them. The Ministry of Commerce has created, by arranging the Chambers of Commerce, out of the 149 which exist in France some seventeen regions. The Journal *Excelsior*, published a map of these on the first of April, 1919.

The Fine Arts have their regional committees for the applied arts. The Universities devote themselves more and more to adapt their teaching to the needs of the regions in which they are situated.

Finally, the Ministry of Agriculture has constituted regional agricultural offices, which will certainly give way soon to Regional Chambers of Agriculture: the Senate has voted in favour of this principle, and it has been approved by the official representatives of French Agriculture at their congress held quite recently.

These are good signs. But still more encouraging symptoms appear in all directions in relation to economic production. Employers and workmen are associating and organising. The idea of the State has been revised. It is possible to foresee the time when the government will be in the workshop, as the great Prudhon predicted. Well, such an organisation is not possible or fruitful without the regional unit.

3. Excessive centralisation, such as that from which France has suffered, is only justified up to a certain point by reasons of military discipline. France was an entrenched camp, always exposed to aggression. But experience has shown, and M. Clemenceau has recently recognised, that this exaggerated centralisation does not meet the requirements of a time of war. If we may hope that a Society of Nations, established on a solid basis, will substitute an era of right and arbitration for bloody conflicts, there remains not one reason for defending French centralisation.

4. National autonomy is not sufficient to maintain peace. War, such as outbursts amongst young nations who are just regaining their independence, might even be a danger. The only foundation for a lasting peace is federation, that is to say the autonomy of each of the units which constitute the state, the village, the province. A people with a federal form of government, like the Swiss, are marvellously good at wars of defence. They do not mix in wars of annexation and conquest. Prudhon has pointed this out clearly. And, on the other hand, once the pyramid is established on its base, and the apprenticeship of liberty has been undergone throughout the whole nation, the nations can unite, according to their particular affinities of culture or of race, and these primary federations will allow later on of the universal federation, which, to the credit of our most illustrious French thinkers, they have foreseen.

M. JEAN HENNESSY.

Député.

I am convinced as to the desirability of the movement, and I am certain that it is born of economic necessity. The present economic situation is brought about by our easy means of transport. Mankind in multiplying these, whether by land or by sea, by the application of scientific discoveries, has reduced the obstacles of distance and weight which militated against the exchange of goods. Trade

increases in consequence. Two economic laws, henceforth, will rule the economic relations of men: that of concentration and that of specialisation. We observe at the present time such great concentrations as have been heretofore unknown. Of this the war of 1914-1919 is an obvious manifestation. Never could this have been of so general a character if the troops of the entire world had not been able to rapidly concentrate on the fields of battle.

The success of strategic operations depended upon facilities for concentrating troops. There was everywhere concentration; urban, industrial, etc. On the other hand, as manufactured products can easily be transported, each country, each region, each commercial or industrial organization, finds itself obliged to produce, under the best conditions possible, the best goods at the lowest selling price; so that firstly the dependence of individuals among themselves in the same state or under the same Tariff—and secondly the dependence of states among themselves—even though separated by Tariff barriers, grows daily. The specialisation of industry, the facility of exchange of goods, ought to ameliorate the conditions of existence for individuals, and completely transform their political relations, which are destined to evolve under the influence of exchanging economic conditions.

The prevention of future wars, or at comparative infrequency depends on the comprehension of this problem. It is over clear that when individuals living in different states depend upon one another for their daily needs, they will be less willing to provoke a war the reactions of which would upset the life of all. Further—the political sense is developing in the masses, and, by natural local affairs, and with it there is naturally developing again in many regions, the desire to manage their local affairs in complete independence.

From the moment that special local interests exist the people elected for this purpose in a region are the only ones who can, with the special knowledge at their command, take the necessary initiative and make decisions in the management of local interests; they alone can make such laws or rules as are locally suitable.

Replying to your question: "What influence from the theoretical and practical point of view can this movement of Regionalism have."? I consider that it should be in every way encouraged; but that in so doing, the general affairs of the State should not be neglected. In fact, perfect equilibrium can only result from a system of federation. Each local group would keep, within the State, the maximum of liberty for the management of its particular affairs; and the federated groups would hold necessary powers to maintain the general equilibrium of the State. Pushing this thought still further—one is brought (and this carries me to your fourth question: "If the nations were organized on an autonomous basis, would this favour a lasting peace,"?) to the following point:—that there is no doubt the federation of great States would end in a general condition of peace, at least, and peace between peoples grouped in the federation. Europe in particular is at present divided into too many states, which can but have an economically precarious life; being too dependent upon each other to exist alone in comfort.

If it is soon realised that there is a general European interest important enough to be considered; and if we do not turn to federal organisation, I do not see how Europe can develop according to modern economic conditions and I foresee a sanguinary future. It is not only in autonomy that I see peace; but in an intimate alliance of states among themselves, grouped in federal organisations. This is not the place to say precisely which federations of states could be established; it will be decided by evolution of the peoples and by the change of ideas caused by the war. What I do say and maintain, is that Europe as now parcelled out is laid open to foreign domination, and forced to internal wars. The problem of organising the League of Nations, is first of all one of giving birth to great federal groups. In France, (and this is the answer to your third question; "do you think the war

and the idea of national autonomy has had an influence on economic and industrial regionalism in France," it is not only the war which has had an influence on the ideas of Regionalists. Regional reform was considered indispensable—to those who knew about it before the war.

The organisation of regionalism in France, is not, however, a question of upsetting the national sovereignty of France, which has been,—since in the revolution it was taken from the monarch who theoretically held it by heredity and divine right—assigned to the whole nation.

Regionalism does not foresee *complete* autonomy (or Home Rule) in each region. It foresees, simply, the constitution of more extended administrative boundaries than now exist. The present departmental system—and the power given to regional administration—is too restricted, it ought at least to be equivalent to that given to municipalities, or to their representatives in cities. But as a matter of fact, strangely paradoxical as it may seem, the 260,000 inhabitants of the city of Bordeaux have wider powers of administration in their city than the 790,000 inhabitants of the department of the Gironde, which is tied up for administrative purposes with Bordeaux, as are also the 270,000 inhabitants of the department of the Creuse.

It is true that there are in France federalists who hold that *complete* dominion should be given to local groups which would come together to delegate to the state certain higher powers. I think this way of looking at the question is extremely dangerous; for necessary as it is to broaden the administrative framework and to give to the departments of France wider powers for self-government, it is just as vital to maintain for France, her national unity.

In your last question you asked: "up to what point do you think that the defeat of Germany will permit a national revocation of the centralisation round Paris,—taking it that such centralisation was but an inevitable defence against German aggression?"—I do not think that, thus expressed, the question is exactly answerable: because French centralisation dates back several centuries, and was accentuated in the 16th and 17th centuries; under the reign of Louis XIV, when France had the preponderant influence in Europe and had nothing to fear from Germany, which was then divided up and sparsely populated. French centralisation was considered by politicians as a dogma. It is therefore older than the nineteenth century.

France would perhaps have been in a better position to resist German aggression if her provinces developed themselves long ago and if they had thus carried through a number of public works. The industrial centralisation round Paris rendered the possible loss of the capital an exceedingly great peril for France, because all her industries were thus concentrated, and here, too, the whole of her railway system was knotted together,—making Paris a railway centre of extraordinary importance. France decentralised—as has been proven by her history—would certainly have as good a capacity for resistance against possible aggression as would an over-centralised France.

To your question: "Could you cite any example of regional independence arising in France in response to a synthesis of regional life"—one can reply that there is a movement of public opinion in Alsace Lorraine, for keeping certain local customs and laws and that the possible division of Alsace Lorraine to fit the old-fashioned departmental framework is extremely criticised. It is preferable to merge Alsace on one side and Lorraine on the other into big territorial administrations, with neighbouring French territory, than to cut up the newly reconquered lands. Profiting by this regional reorganisation on the frontiers of France which is imposed by circumstances, it would be well to adopt a general measure applicable throughout the country—and to make this regional reorganisation extend to all France. Besides this there is manifest in the devastated regions, united among

themselves by the difficulties encountered by the inhabitants in the reconstruction of their lands—a strong movement towards autonomous organisation. There also, necessity provides opportunity for the realisation of a measure which could be applied to the whole country—through the study of the exceptional measures which have become a vital need in the regions so disturbed by the war—in the name of and in the interest of the state, complete regional reform could thus be accomplished in a homogeneous and well ordered fashion.

The following extracts from letters are interesting in so far as they bear on the question actually under consideration.

M. EDUARD HERRIOT.

Maire de Lyon. Sénateur du Rhon.

I must reply at once that the number of my engagements do not permit me to answer the different questions which you have been kind enough to send me directly. I have expressed my views in my book, "Crêr," published by Payot, 106 Boulevard St. Germain, Paris.

M. FIGIERI.

Directeur des Affaires Commerciales et Industrielles, Ministère du Commerce, Paris.

I know that you have also sent the same Questionnaire to M. Henri Hauser, secretary to the Institute, now on a mission to the Ministry of Commerce. M. Hauser is directly engaged, with myself, on all questions of economic regionalism, and my views are therefore in no way different from his, which he hopes to send you very shortly. Kindly consider, therefore, that the reply from M. Hauser and from myself are one and the same, as we both speak on behalf of the policy of the Ministry of Commerce.

MARQUIS DE L'ESTOURBEILLON.

Chevalier de la Légion d'Honneur. Député du Morbihan.

Owing to my repeated absence during the past month and a half, I have not been able to reply, to my great regret, to the interesting questions, on Regionalism which you have been kind enough to send me. The questions, however, interest me exceedingly. . . . I hope you will accept a pamphlet which I consider it my duty to send you, which has had, for some months past, a considerable influence: its effect on our Breton issue will be great, and it has already begun to awaken a serious movement on behalf of our just and legitimate demands.

Extract from the pamphlet, *Le Droit des Langues et La Liberté des Peuples*.

When in June, 1918, the text of President Wilson's famous Declaration appeared in Brittany, proclaiming, amongst other things in his 14 articles, the imprescriptible Right of the Peoples to self-determination, great was the emotion of the Breton People.

What reminiscences there were! What hopes was not such a Declaration naturally bound to arouse, and give a new birth to many Breton hearts and brains!

From June to November we were overwhelmed with numerous letters, often very urgent ones, begging us to seize this opportunity to take up the defence of the Breton cause. Many, in their enthusiasm, but in entire unconsciousness of the facts, went so far as to order us to take the initiative in presenting an address, or an appeal to President Wilson. To give way to such injunctions would have been as foolish as it was criminal.

We are certainly amongst those, who, for many years past have never ceased to demand the moral and administrative autonomy of our Brittany within the State, which is her undeniable right. But how could we forget for an instant

what we have as a first duty? It is a duty to nationality. Is it not true that if we are and remain Bretons in France, we are, and mean to remain, French in presence of the foreigner?

Would it not have been mad for us French to complain of France to the Members of the Peace Conference, or of the Society of Nations. For our part, we should have considered it a treasonable action, as a crime against our country, the mere idea of which fills me with horror, and we have regarded it as a fundamental duty to prevent, in so far as we could, any action of this character.

But in this matter the facts could, and ought also to be faced in a rational and perfectly just way.

The Delegates of the Peace Conference, and more especially the members of the Commission of the Society of Nations, were constituted as a sort of Tribunal of the Peoples, called, it seemed, to proclaim Principles, to establish for the future Rules of Right, or of *intangible security*. Well, why should not the *incorporated* Peoples, like the completely independent Peoples, be able, logically and even suitably, to bring their grievances on their personal demands before the Delegates, on their own account? Who would be able to deny them this right, which belongs to any simple citizen of no matter what State, of impressing on these Delegates the importance of certain *general principles*, of interest not only to themselves, but to many nations more or less in their position?

Well, is not the right of using one's own language, and of its free teaching one of those tangible principles which affects every nation, whoever it may be? And has not the disregard of this been, in all ages, the cause of bloody struggles and countless conflicts?

Is it not merely to use a right belonging to every human being, and at the same time to serve the interests of many Peoples, who in the future may be more or less oppressed or molested, if we demand that this Right be proclaimed indestructible from henceforth, and that the future Society of Nations should confirm the obligation of all Peoples to respect it?

M. CHARLES GIDE.

Professor of the Faculty of Law, University of Paris.

The movement towards national autonomy is an inevitable result of the war, and is in particular an effect of the reciprocal blockade which terrified the nations, but it is not assuredly a desirable occurrence. It is, on the contrary, a real retrogression in evolution which ought to aim at the unity of the human species. It is, in fact, incompatible with the creation of a Society of Nations, for every society, whether made up of individuals or of peoples can only live in so far as each of its members sacrifices a portion of his rights and consents to live in a certain degree for others.

It is therefore necessary to try to get rid of this tendency towards national autonomy first by commercial treaties of as broad a nature as possible. In these there should be no hesitation in sacrificing the so-called national industries whenever they cannot show, after experience, that they are in a situation to sustain foreign competition. Secondly by the extension of International Associations in all departments, economic, scientific and artistic: about a hundred of these were already in existence before the war.

As to the movement towards regional autonomy, which is also advocated, it has no connection with the above, and cannot be considered as a consequence of the war, as it had begun long before. This movement may be considered as very desirable; doubtless it may be regarded as a retrogression in evolution in so far that it tends to revive local atmosphere, costume, customs perfect still in language and literature, which were believed to have disappeared for ever. But this

resurrection will not spoil the moral unity of the country in which it occurs: it will not be, like national autonomy, the cause of conflict, of tears, and of war. It does not raise customs barriers between the regions. It does not interfere with work done in common, but on the contrary, helps it by a better organisation, a sort of division of regional labour. It is as necessary to encourage regional autonomy as to discourage national autonomy.

As to the last question, I do not understand its meaning. I do not think that the fear of Germany has been the principal, or even the accessory cause of the centralisation of France, nor do I consequently believe that the defeat of Germany will have as a result a movement in the contrary direction, namely, towards decentralisation. If indeed one ought to judge by what has actually taken place, never has the tendency towards Paris been so strong: but perhaps it is only a momentary phenomenon about which it would be premature to draw conclusions.

M. ROGER PICAUD.

Doctor of Law. Professor at the Ecole Supérieure de Commerce de Paris.

(1) It seems to me somewhat difficult to determine at present if the war has exercised any influence on Regionalism in France. But it may be said that the movement for the propaganda of this doctrine, already very active in 1914, has increased. Numerous articles and many books have been written to bring it before public notice, and societies were founded to support it.

In practice, new institutions have taken the region for their unit during the war: we may cite the committees for economical objects, bodies whose function it was to show the utility of the various rules of an economic kind, necessitated by the war. Moreover, public thinkers are engaged in determining the unit of future administrative regions, and in grouping the Chambers of Commerce amongst them, both for the department and the district.

As a matter of fact, the invaded regions, now freed, find that they have very distinct interests from the rest, and are being forced to organise their study and defence. A certain Federation of Northern Departments even came into existence, but has not survived the death of its founder. On the other hand certain unofficial committees still exist, and continue to work.

(2) Will the defeat of Germany have any influence on regionalism? Another difficult question. Germany possessed up till now a very marked regional life; if the defeat of a people forces the conquerors to run counter to its institutions, it would appear that the German defeat would lead to a reaction towards an aftermath of centralisation.

Still, it appears very likely that regionalism will make progress in France; our country needs to get the full value out of all its resources; each region will discover new ones, and the improvement of these will be an attraction for the inhabitants and will furnish a means of developing and crystallizing the other elements of social life.

(3) Will Regionalism have good results on international peace? I think so. Its development, by causing men to mix more in public life, and by making them handle public interests, will keep them away from the misunderstandings and the blind passions which provoke wars.

Local autonomy is not irreconcilable with national autonomy: it conditions it in a measure. This national autonomy in its turn is not at all opposed to the exploiting in common by the different countries of the means of production or of the economic resources necessary to the life of the whole human race; transport, colonies, etc. And it is quite possible to conceive these great common interests as being handled by a vast society, of which the autonomous States would alone be shareholders.

But the future alone will teach us if the war has assisted this very desirable fusion of interests, which does not necessarily entail any confusion amongst nationalities.

M. A. KEUFER.

Secretary of the Federated Bookworkers Unions.

I should have been happy to reply within the limits fixed by the Questionnaire you have been good enough to send me, but the times do not allow me sufficient leisure for reflection on these grave questions, which are, however, occupying the attention of certain groups in France.

I therefore send some suggestions of which you can make use if you desire to do so.

(1) The movement which is favourable to world-wide and local autonomy, in the sense of a relative independence, may lead humanity towards a desirable state of peace. But, on the other hand, this autonomy would destroy national solidarity which is indispensable in the political condition of Europe, and of the world. And the economic conditions of the nations, and independence which results therefrom, are little favourable to world-wide, national or local autonomy. The more industry and banking develop, the more are the nations dependent upon each other.

(2) Yes: the war has contributed towards the birth of the idea of Regionalism, economic and industrial, but it has taken on a more general character and it has been inspired by a feeling of separatism, of regionalism, military and agricultural, which would have disastrous consequences from the point of view of national defence.

The divisions of the country into provinces would prepare for a decentralised autonomy, and would favour initiative in each region and each province, and would have a moral influence favouring pacific sentiment; but it is, nevertheless, necessary to maintain the unity of the nation, in case of legitimate defence, or of aggression.

(3) The defeat of Germany will contribute, by reason of the circumstances of the defeat, to a continuation of the concentration in Paris of all institutions—Paris, the capital, the brain, the nervous system of France. But, to take a hypothetical case, if the Germans had been able to conquer Paris, sack, pillage and annihilate it, it would have been the complete ruin of France, reduced to powerlessness by the destruction of all its intellectual scientific and artistic life; and the destruction of all the means of traffic. Thus is shown the danger of a too concentrated national life, the necessity for distributing the initiatives, and of awakening regionalism, with the intellectual resources, both regional and local. Then the need becomes apparent for a rallying centre for all these energies and activities, regional and local, the source of national power, of the conservation of all material and moral wealth, and of the solidarity necessary between all the regions in order to defend national unity.

These suggestions are too slight for them to be worth much attention.

M. A. DAUDE BANCEL.

General Secretary of the National Federation of Consumers Co-operative Societies, and Chancellor of the French Section of the International Order of Good Templars.

All movements directed towards the autonomy of the nations of the world, or of regions within nations, are desirable. It makes possible the best political system, namely political federation, in which the representatives of the different regions in a country can meet and deliberate freely.

A society resting on the federalist form of government, well conceived and well applied by enlightened citizens, conscious of their rights and of their civic duties, would be a valuable element in favour of a lasting peace between the nations.

France is a very centralised country, but it does not owe its centralised form of government to the anxiety to defend themselves from German aggression from which the French people have suffered.

The evil of French centralisation dates from Napoleon 1st, who gave to France a form of government which rests on a conception very like that generally adopted by great conquerors, and which in other respects has been fatal to them.

On the other hand, if the geography of France be carefully considered it is not astonishing to see that the principal French railways go towards Paris.

If, by a hardly conceivable catastrophe, Paris had been destroyed by the Huns, in the course of this war, it would have been quickly reconstructed, and on the very same site, for it is at the intersection of numerous railways. The same would be true so long as we have a land and water system of transport like that which we now employ. And, it must not be forgotten, that, thanks to its fortunate situation in the *Ile de France*, Paris is at the meeting place of numerous rivers and canals.

But these facts are not stated to excuse French centralisation. It would be a good thing if the war had a radical and positive influence in favour of economic and industrial regionalism in France.

The war has shown that it is possible to produce as well in the provinces as in Paris. The result of the German occupation of the departments of France most engaged in industry has been to awaken industrial life in certain departments of the Midi. But will not various contingencies, (such as the great heat), which have hindered industrial development in these departments up to the war, paralyze and finally destroy it?

In any case, the war will have allowed us to dream of the execution of works which, until 1914, had no great chance of success. For instance one can now foresee as quite possible before very long the tunnel under the Channel, Paris a seaport, a Brest-Transatlantic service, the tunnelling of the Vosges at several points, the St. Nazaire-Nantes-la-Pallice-Bordeaux, (Grand Central), and Lyon-Genève-Venise-Trieste-Constantinople services; the enlargement and the junction of canals and rivers, a navigable Rhone, and irrigating canals derived from the Rhone, the electrification of the railway systems of France, etc.

The division of France into economic regions is an accomplished fact. It will impel the manufacturers and merchants in the same region to unite their efforts, without being obsessed by the idea of an alluring and fascinating Paris.

This economic reform will compel reforms in the political constitution based on a wise regionalism. But a long time will necessarily elapse before economic and political reform is accomplished: a nation does not undergo with impunity a Napoleonic rule of more than a century.

Even before the war, under the influence of energetic regional banks, economic life had been greatly strengthened in some regions of France: particularly in the north (Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing), and in the east, (Nancy-Epinal).

And on their side the French railway companies, and those of the State had, made meritorious efforts towards decentralisation, such as the Calais-Bale-Brindisi; Calais-Cote-d'Azur-Vintimille: Menton-Port Bou: Cherbourg-Tours-Bordeaux-Irun: Nantes-la-Rochelle-Bordeaux lines.

If Capital, Labour and Talent can but collaborate in a France, bruised but tempered by the most terrible of wars, and if the ideas of federalism are favourably welcomed, there is a great likelihood that out of this applied regionalism will emerge great benefits for France and for the world.

M. MAX LAZARD.

Secretary to the Association to obviate Unemployment. Chief Editor of the *Bulletin de l'Association internationale pour la lutte contre le chômage.*

In order to reply clearly to the Questionnaire which you have been good enough to send me, I shall ask to be allowed to treat the two questions of economic nationalism and economic regionalism separately. You ask, in short, on the one hand if the war and victory have strengthened directly or indirectly one or the other of these tendencies: and on the other hand, and supposing that the reply to the first question be in the affirmative, if this evolution does or does not appear favourable to the general interests. On this very complicated problem, I append, in so far as it concerns France, my ideas, and I must ask you in advance to forgive me if I do not follow exactly the order of your Questionnaire.

(1) Has the war strengthened economic nationalism? Yes: but it has also strengthened the inverse tendency towards the interdependence of peoples. When any country aspires to total economic independence it tries, in point of fact, not only to intensify international commerce, but even to organise on rational bases the distribution of materials of primary importance. In other words, it seems that the same phenomenon occurs in the economic world as in the political, where the principle of nationalities and of the Society of Nations, in spite of the contradictions involved, are simultaneously proclaimed.

Protective national economy, with international division of work and production are explained by the fact that they have a common root in the knowledge of the necessity for intensifying production everywhere. To this end each country tries first to improve to the full its economic potentialities—and this tends in the direction of protective national economy—but the simple policy of good sense, which advocates that each country should specialize in the productions for which it is best suited, forces itself on the different associated countries very soon—that is to say immediately on every civilised country—and then the contrary principle of economic interdependence triumphs. During the war all the political economy of the Allies turned on these two points: after the war, with or without the participation of Germany, the same phenomena will be reproduced. We shall find amongst us once more, under new forms, the old conflict of protection and free trade. It would be a one sided view of this real complexity to take into account one only of the two tendencies.

(2) Does the evolution of economic nationalism seem desirable from the point of view of public interest, and especially with regard to the preservation of peace?

One might argue in favour of an affirmative answer, that if each nation was economically independent of every other nation, there would be no longer any reason to wish to improve its situation by war. But who does not see the weakness of this argument? So many wars in the past have developed between peoples holding a protective policy. He who has wishes to have more. Under other circumstances, on the other hand, economic interdependence is not sufficient by itself alone to prevent conflicts. Before these break out it gives rise to the hunger of the "markets"; after the opening of hostilities it has no influence as the curb it was commonly supposed to be before 1914. The example of Germany in this double connection is plainly significant. General interdependence, solidarity moral and intellectual, and above all political, in which solidarity, economic interdependence is a condition necessary, but not alone sufficient, and of which the expression is the federation of Nations, this alone offers, with the hope of a lasting peace, a favourable chance of progress to civilisation.

(3) Has the war strengthened French regionalism, either theoretically or practically? The war has been above all things a school for national unity for France,

It would be a contradiction if it had at the same time strengthened regionalism, except within those limits in which it was a question of a simple administrative reform, to which many good people attach importance, does not appear to have more partisans now than it had before the war. It only comes second or third in the lists of demands for reform of various leagues working for the "reconstruction" of the country. In a certain sense, however, it may be said that the war has favoured the regional tendency. In fact, in order to face the necessarily ever-growing demands of national defence, it was imperative to make use of all the national wealth of un-invaded France, wherever they might be. The installation of non-combatant services in the rear of the allied armies, and particularly of the American army at different points, has worked in the same direction. It is true that even so Paris, and the region of Paris, has kept its supremacy, but the part asked of the provinces has been steadily increasing, with the result that new workshops have arisen and there has been a better management of ports and railways, an improvement in waterfalls; in short, a general intensification of industrial activity, in the advantages of which every region in the country, taken separately, has largely participated.

(4) Does the military victory over Germany tend to create an atmosphere favourable to the development of Regionalism?

Yes and no. As a result of the German menace the feeling of national solidarity was naturally strengthened, and the importance of the capital as the centre of national life tended to increase, whilst now that this menace has disappeared the separated tendencies, in so far as they exist will be more free to show themselves. On the other hand, as long as France was exposed to German aggression, it was very dangerous to accumulate, as in former days, all the resources of the country in Paris, with the logical result that when the risk of invasion disappeared, a favourable atmosphere was created for the progress of centralizing tendencies.

(5) Does the evolution towards Regionalism seem desirable?

In order to formulate an opinion on this last point it is necessary to return to a distinction implied in the two preceding paragraphs, and to state precisely the different meanings of the word Regionalism. In the most general acceptance of the word, it means the development of the industries and commerce of the region. But this development can be viewed from two different standpoints, according as to whether one's ideas turn towards separatism, or, on the other hand, towards the doctrine of national solidarity. With separatist Regionalism the end pursued is to endow the region with all industries and commerce, and with all the means of production which would allow it to lead an independent life, and to be, by itself, a complete economic entity. With the Regionalism of solidarity, on the other hand, the aim is to intensify local life, to leave no natural wealth unused, but with the idea that the region is an indissoluble part of the nation, and that the work must be divided amongst the different regions in order to arrive at the maximum total of production. In short, the dominant idea would be to arrange for each region to specialize in whatever form of production they might best be fitted for.

The Regionalism developed in France by the war, that is Regionalism of the kind which it is desirable to cultivate in victory, is this Regionalism of solidarity, that is to say which tends to make France richer, more full of life, in every part, but always as a united whole. There is a Regionalism which happily remained unknown amongst us during the years of trial, that is a separatist Regionalism, and as to which one may hope that in spite of the difficulties of the period of transition, and especially the difficulties in the midst of which the regions that were victims of invasion are struggling, it will not now make its appearance. It is the régime of division and egotism, in which the apparent independence of

social groups, indefinitely broken up, would be bought at the price of a common weakness and of the general decay of civilization.

M. HENRI MAZEL.

I think that the world war cannot but have a good influence on the development of French economic Regionalism.

This, not because of the principle of nationalities, and of the liberty of enslaved peoples, (France happily enslaves no one, and her Alsacians, Basques, Flemings, or Provencals, are all deeply attached to the mother country), but because of the diffusion of the liberal and democratic principle which is the soul of modern civilization.

Further, it is possible to foresee a very natural and legitimate reaction against the rigorous measures of centralization rendered necessary by the war. A certain measure of commercial liberty has already been officially granted.

Indeed, the example of Alsace Lorraine will certainly favour the progress of this regionalist idea. Alsace Lorraine returns to France with a personality which has been accentuated by the effect of half a century of separation from us, and which she is trying to preserve within the limits compatible with national unity and safety. It is probable that the other French regions will try to free themselves from the old official life which is too heavy and irksome, by following the example.

This movement of liberation has not yet begun, because it can only come when the central Government loosens the administrative bonds. It will be for the next Parliament to establish the *Regionalist Charter*, and to transfer the powers of which it thinks it should deprive itself to the new local assemblies, which will be constituted on a more generous model than the present general Councils, let us hope.

Those interested should from henceforth keep the Parliament up to date, by formulating their views on the subject of this future Charter. And here the Leagues of Education, the professional Associations, the Chambers of Commerce, the Universities, local Academies, the Trade Unions with initiative, the newspaper and journals, etc., of the Department can play an important part, in conjunction with the elected political Councils.

But, and this is an important point, the development of the regionalistic idea will not be wholesome except in a healthy atmosphere. The air of the local political clubs has been vitiated for a long time past by the miasma from "stagnant marshes," and by the little great men of the cafés in the *Grand Place* of so many market towns, who have justly been called ridiculous tyrants. It is these small places that it is above all important to purify, in order to allow of harmony and work, the loyal representation of parties, frank expression of interests, good selection of governing bodies, good recruiting of functionaries, responsibility for everyone, and the civic spirit for all; once all this comes about, but not before, there will be room for a wide, sincere, powerful regional life.

What will be the limits of this Regionalism? And what precautions should be taken in order that it should not prejudice the unity and security of the nation? It is an important question, but one which should not be treated here. Let us remember only that the example of a country like the United States, at once very decentralized, and very susceptible of strong centralization when circumstances demand it, shows that the problem is not insoluble. If the situation was different, and if regional autonomy allowed each region to escape from measures of national defence, or from the limitations of the Society of Nations, when it is working regularly, this autonomy would not be an element for a durable international peace, but, on the contrary, a factor making for egotism and anarchy, and thus an instigation to the instincts of violence against which civilization must continue to guard itself.

CURRENT CRITICISM OF "THE STATE."

I.

THE American *Dial*, a long-established literary fortnightly, sometime ago transformed itself into a journal of Reconstruction. In its new mode, *The Dial* is doing a service unique amongst English-written periodicals, since the *Athenæum*, after its too brief career as an organ of Reconstruction, reverted to the literary rôle. By way of sampling the aims, method and outlook of *The Dial* in reference to current issues, we select a series of extracts from two articles devoted to exposition and criticism of recent books dealing in one case with the League of Nations, and in the other with the more general problems of political philosophy. These extracts exemplify the undercurrent of destructive criticism now running against established theories of the State, alike conventional and insurgent. They also exemplify the critical attitude towards the League of Nations adopted by most American intellectuals of radical or liberal tendency. Both the chosen articles are by Mr. Lewis Mumford, an associate-editor of *The Dial*. A wide circle of readers will be interested to know that on the editorial board of *The Dial* is Mr. Thorstein Veblen, most sociological of economists, master of lucid and pungent language, incomparable satirist, exquisite analyst. To each number of the journal he contributes a characteristic interpretation of current events.

II.

Under title *Wardom and the State*, Mr. Mumford writes of half-a-dozen current books which seek for political ways towards international comity "beneath their several expositions is a common weakness: a refusal to examine the nature of States before discussing the terms of their pacification. They largely deny the efficacy of the statesman's peace, but they are not prepared to question the validity of the statesman's State. Because the State in modern times has been the unit that waged war, the political theorists have uncritically assumed that it is this unit which must be used in erecting the structure of a lasting peace. The League of Nations is to be a league of more or less sovereign States. It appears that at bottom our publicists have sought the best possible solution of this 'quite insoluble and impossible problem'—given a world of States to produce a peacedom from their united action. They have been in quest of a legal mechanism which shall absorb the shock of conflict between political institutions ever in danger of collision: they have not sought to establish the sort of political society in which the possibilities of collision would be removed. Peace has meant to the internationalist the absence of warfare in a world community constituted much like the present one. He has failed to see, as William James and other writers have from various angles pointed out, that a society organized like the present one is constitutionally in a state of warfare. What we have ambiguously called peace is only passive wardom. . . . The State is not an instrument adapted to international functions. Not until honesty can be produced in a world of thieves will peacedom be possible in a world of national States. To place reliance upon current diplomatic, military, and governmental agencies to create effective organs of international intercourse and control is to discount our political hopes from the beginning and to put a premium on disappointment. . . . Now there are no checks within the organization

of the State upon its own powers and dispositions: the American experience with the checks and balance doctrine is exemplary proof. If we are to find a method of curbing the League from an attempt at world dominion and world exploitation for the benefit of the several great Powers we must utilize the same methods in dealing with the international organization as have proved valuable in dealing with the separate national State. We must employ, that is to say, the great industrial, professional, and civic associations deliberately to challenge the sovereignty of the State when it steps outside its purely pacific and administrative sphere. For in the growth of voluntary associations, linking across frontiers, lies the possibility of diminishing the strength of those compulsive military organizations which still, whether in isolation or in alliance, threaten the peace of the world.

"These voluntary associations divide into two classes: those that have, and those that do not have economic power. The second kind of association was thriving before the war; it comprised the scientific societies with international affiliations, the institutes of hygiene, medical research, and town planning; and the purely professional associations like those of lawyers, doctors, and so forth. The International Institute of Bibliography at Brussels was naturally deposited by the current of world interests which seemed visibly before 1914 to be bringing about a unity throughout western civilization. With proper encouragement it may yet develop as a world centre for scholarly research—a clearing house for the intellectual transactions of mankind. The great universities likewise, through their exchange professorships, were recovering some of that humane cosmopolitanism which characterized them at their best during the Middle Ages. What has been lacking so far is the definite and purposeful attempt to build up a community in thought and purpose which shall run counter to the narrow, partisan, incomplete, and ultimately military purposes of the national State.

"Associations for international contact and intercourse are necessary in order to supply a favourable atmosphere in which the economic associations of the first type may function. Among the latter we may place the national trade unions like the British Triple Alliance, international unions like the Amalgamated Ladies' Garment Workers, and consumers' associations of national range like the British and Russian Co-operatives. Within these several kinds of association, with their deepening international affiliations and their growing realization of power, lies the opportunity for a truly federal world-organization which shall begin with the local production or consumption unit and ramify outward in increasing disregard of formal national boundaries. It is obvious that current national divisions are inimical to functional economical adjustments. The national State is out of joint with that Great Society whose framework has been erected during the past century. The Belgian worker who commutes every day to a factory in Lille where he works as an alien and retires at night to a village in Belgium where he sleeps as a citizen is surely an anomalous figure: but his position typifies the incongruity of industrial and political facts in the modern world. To abolish fake political divisions is the first step in building up a community in which the development of the arts and sciences of peacemaking shall play a greater part than the maintenance of the military unity and the belligerent isolation of the national State.

"There is no short cut from the statesmen's negative 'peace' to the active and positive state of peacemaking. It requires more than a lawyer's covenant: it demands a new civilization. This new civilization must accommodate itself to the technique of the Great Industry. The national State works at cross purposes with the Great Industry, for the reason that it seeks to isolate that which is in fact the joint product of the world community. That is why, albeit the national State is strong, the communities that have already passed beyond national statehood, however incompletely—like the United States and Great Britain—are stronger. That

fact will seal in the long run the doom of national States, with their almost rhythmic alternations of passive and active warfare. And in the death of this military organization lies the hope of a new order."

III.

In another article, entitled *The Status of the State*, Mr. Mumford reviews a batch of books, which include Professor Edward Jenks' *The State and the Nation*, Mr. Harold J. Laski's *Authority on the Modern State*, and Mr. H. J. Mackinder's *Democratic Ideals and Reality*. In the course of this article Mr. Mumford says: "About the origin and nature of the State there has been more perverse theorizing than about any other phenomenon except deity. The State has meant all things to all men. The chief difficulty of the political philosopher has been to reconcile its coercive power with any notion of its voluntary institution, and its general acceptance, by the community at large. Is it out of war or peace that the State was born? Does it exist by force or by consent? Those questions appear at the very outset of any illuminant discussion; they delimit the respective positions of Socrates and Thrasymachus at the opening of Plato's greatest political dialogue. Socrates believes that the State is but an organ of community; Thrasymachus holds, on the other hand, that the State exists not for the benefit of the community but for the advantage of the governing classes. He anticipates Nietzsche and Treitschke. 'In all States, what is just and what is advantageous for the established government are the same; it hath the power. So that it appears to him who reasons rightly that, in all case, what is the advantage of the more powerful, the same is just.'

"The history of Western Europe confirms the prussic realism of Thrasymachus. . . . The State does not take its origin in the family, the clan, the tribe, the village, the city, or the mark. By no conceivable federalization of these units could the compulsive military organization we name the State be produced. It is, on the contrary, a foreign institution thrust upon the more or less peaceful inhabitants of a given territory by a group of hunter-warriors, whose sole initial purpose is simply to live on the land without participating in its economic labours. . . .

Now at first the State was little more than its government, and territorial compactness was not one of its attributes. The Crown lands were scattered. The capital of the State was wherever the king happened to be quartered for the night. Just before the beginning of those religious wars which disrupted the universal polity of the Roman Church a process of consolidation resulted in the definition of the rigidly bounded national State we know to-day.

In order to keep the archives of the State accessible and safe a national capital was erected and a stable seat of government established. Thereafter the capital of the State was the centre of all civil authority, and instead of merely unifying and co-ordinating independent local functions the State got more and more into the habit of formulating its policies without respect to the interests of the discrete and increasingly powerless provincial groups in the hinterland.

It is an error to think that the early military State was all-powerful. Its position was too precarious for that. What made the State finally sovereign in authority was the breakup of the feudal system, the collapse of town economy, and the rise of the concept of nationality, coincident with the development of a common native language. The state capital became the centre of art, science, and literature. The culture of the capital succeeded in passing itself off on the provinces as the one authentic and indisputable "national" culture. The boundaries of the State in Western Europe were made roughly coincident with the limits of a single language. Within those boundaries, after the pattern set in the national capital, the life of the nation became encysted. The Defence of the Realm became the chief end of statesmanship. Internally it meant the suppression of all national,

religious, and civic groups which refused to acknowledge the overwhelming supremacy and moral authority of the State. Externally it meant the challenging of all foreign governments which threatened to contend for the possession of the vested interests and privileges which the State preserved for those who ruled within.

The omnipotent powers of the State are perhaps good "for duration of war" because it is in warfare that the peculiar functions of the State are exercised without internal rivalry. But as soon as the herd instinct ceases to evoke the attitude so necessary to group conflict, the united front, we find that the sovereignty of the State is subject to limitation as a result of the pressure of custom, law, and current moral judgment. Above all, perhaps, because man is a city-building animal, and his civic needs are not met by the lean satisfactions of his life as the member of a political State.

Now if the political theorist commits the error of thinking that the Individual and the State are the only entities that need be considered there are really only one of two loyalties possible for him. He may follow the Hegelian method and deny the individual, or he may take the Spencerian lead and deny the State. But the Spencerian effort to make the State responsible by making it impotent was based upon an incomplete sociological analysis, which neglected the fundamental need of all developed individuals for participation in some form of associative life. Historically the State has not become weakened by the emphasis on the isolated individual: it actually has tended to take over functions which would otherwise be in the hands of vigorous voluntary associations. The belief in this process of substitution is the characteristic of state socialism. But obviously the more functions that the State absorbs the more compulsive and irresistible will be its authority.

Because the province of the State is as wide as its territories its claim to exercise control over every department of civil life within that area is by no means substantiated. It is not the amount of territory it covers, but the number of interests it subsumes, that matters to the citizen. The State is not, and must never be permitted to become, the only group organization open to the individual. The State is, and must remain, but one association among many. Nor is the State by itself, after all, the most powerful organization. The State becomes formidable only when it is able to attract the allegiance of various corporations, communities, and associations that co-exist with it, and that are (despite the legal fiction of incorporation) co-ordinate with the State and independent of it for their existence. Without the good will of these groups the State is destitute of authority; without their active co-operation it is impotent.

Now the constitution of the modern State does not represent its real relation to the body politic. It is, we are all agreed, a territorial society in which representation in the legislature is apportioned on the basis of an arbitrary division of the country into "states," provinces, cantons, counties, districts, or departments. In theory the representative goes to the national capital on behalf of his locality, and some observers are so innocent as to believe that "representation by locality" is responsible for the notorious lapses and futilities of modern democratic government. These observers advocate representation by classes and interests. As a matter of fact there has never been, since the close of the Middle Ages, any other kind of organization. A member of Parliament does not vote as the member of a community: he represents the political party whose control of the State the majority of his constituents has assented too: and as such he stands for a certain set of diffused group interests centred about—let us say—a protective tariff, or the collective ownership of public utilities. If the interests of localities had genuinely been dominant the State and Federal governments in the United States would not have increased so greatly in power and prestige. Political platforms,

however are hardly under the surveillance of the local members of the parties. Hence the interests that they have furthered have been those advocated, not by particular cities or regions, but by active economic minorities. If we have not had a universal representation by interests it is only because we have permitted the substitute of representation by—apathies.

Granting that the State can function only by the advice and consent of these corporate groups the important problem for discussion is how the groups themselves are to be constituted. The question is not, as Mr. Mackinder supposes in his *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, *Interests versus Localities*; it is to what extent localities will figure in the development and formulation of interests. That the groups which guide the state must be made responsible goes without saying. But how are the purposes of these groups to be formulated; how are their wills to be carried out? At the final stage many political thinkers envisage a National Congress composed of industrial and professional associations with a representation proportionate to their respective memberships. This they denominate a producer's parliament, and the English theorists would counterbalance it with a consumer's parliament in which representatives would be drawn not from trades but from geographic areas. If representation by locality, however, be the fiction we have asserted, this bi-cameral conception is unworkable; for it would represent a cleavage between economic groups functioning through occupational associations and economic groups functioning through political associations, and in case of conflict there would be no other kind of agreement than that enforced by superior physical power.

Developments within the trade-union movement during the last half decade show that there is still a third possibility. In many cases the workers have found that organization by highly centralized national unions has the same defect that organization by centralized national states is guilty of—it ignores regional needs, peculiarities and differences, and carries controlling power too far away from the those most concerned in its immediate application. The shop steward in England, the shop committee in America, and the factory Soviet in Hungary and Russia suggest that economic interests themselves must be organized primarily on a local basis. The federation of these local units within a single city or region; and the federation of regional labor associations into national or transnational bodies seem the more desirable methods of organization. This suggests plainly a reconciliation of the individual's interests as a worker and as a citizen, as the member of an industrial and the member of a political society. Both current theories leave these functions unintegrated: the politician would have the individual forget his class interests; the international trades-unions executive would have him ignore his place interests. Ultimately, the security against arbitrary oppression by producers and consumers, drawn up in battle array, lies in the possibility of establishing this common basis for both of them. The city-region itself would function in this federal scheme as but a coeval economic association of consumers—not as a superior, governmental institution. Thus the State would eventually be neutralized—it would amount to little more than a highly respected Bureau of Standards. That is a far cry from the position it pretends to hold at present. But it may not in point of time be a distant one."

THE NEW JERUSALEM.

THE appointment of Professor Geddes by the International Zionist Committee to advise them in their plans and projects is interesting if only as an instance of the civic sociologist coming into practical leadership, and moreover, on the first plane of public affairs. For the reaction upon the world at large, of this new Return of the Jews, may prove to be deep and widespread. Professor Geddes' mission is twofold. He is engaged first to design the renewal of Jerusalem as the culture centre of Palestine; and more particularly through its projected University; next to plan towards the development of Palestine as a land flowing once more with milk and honey—and even growing once more with corn, wine and oil—and looking for inspiration and leadership to Jerusalem. Is there not here a conjunction that may also help towards larger harmony? Europe, torn and ravaged by war and by political and class struggle, may, and too before many years, see Jerusalem once more as "the joy of the whole earth"; and now not only as a well-head of ancient sanctity but even more as a centre of new hope and deliverance from the old politico-economic order of ideas which have at length brought the world to its present condition. Where indeed more fittingly than from Palestine could the new order—the post-Germanic order of ideas—be inaugurated? Unlike the modern European countries, but in continuation of the old tradition of the Sacred City, centering in the Temple, the leadership of Jerusalem will be expressed through the new University of Israel, and not through the establishment of mere bureaucracy. The University will also be developed to be in touch with, and to inspire the regional development of Palestine. Jerusalem—who can doubt it?—will once more become a place of pilgrimage, not only for its past, but because there, seekers may find counsel for the present and inspiration for the future. From this centre a new spirit may well spread over our disturbed western world, and we may see the fulfilment of the old tradition common to Christian and Jew that "the return of the Jews to Palestine should herald the millennium." For in this great vision the theological world has, as so often in other ways, anticipated the later idealism of the sciences, and their best applications. This fulfilment may come with the social sciences taking up their leadership and pressing forward towards constructive peace in replacement of the destructive age of nature-exhaustion and of wars, into which the leadership of the physical sciences has led us. This misdirection by the lower sciences was effected through their dominance during the vogue of biologic theories like those of Darwin, and economic and political theories to match, like those now passing away. That the long-delayed rise into authority of the social and psychological sciences over the physical ones is now approaching many signs show. That is the revolution in thought for which sociologists have for two generations and more been working.

S. B.

THE THIRD ALTERNATIVE *

I

BUSINESS AND PHILANTHROPY.

THE tendency of things to polarise into the sharp contrasts of mutually exclusive categories is perhaps nowhere more marked than in the case of Business and Philanthropy. Yet as life is ever pushing beyond logic, so things separated in thought and in custom come together again in vital action. How often in reality and in fiction does the leading personage make the most of both worlds for himself, and satisfy the onlooker's sense of the dramatic, by filling the double role of Financier and Philanthropist! In the subtle alchemy of his personality he combines two opposite sets of qualities and by this reconciliation of apparent incompatibles he advances in the esteem of the world. In its cult of the millionaire-philanthropist, the popular instinct thus does, for all its crudity, recognize dimly the latency of that "Third Alternative" towards which the line of development generally runs. The cutting edge of modern business, we have long been given to suppose, is Finance; and though the path it cuts is frequently, as it were, downwards and backwards, yet sometimes it is upwards and onwards. If then there be here, deep below the surface, something of the ethically progressive, we are on the track of what is no mere compromise between business that in itself is sordid and a philanthropy intrinsically futile. Rather are we discovering how to develop the germinal qualities of each into a new and finer growth. Setting out with the purpose of finding this Third Alternative to business and philanthropy, let us explore the labyrinth of our financial system. And to give to the quest an objective of immediate and topical interest, we will try to conduct the enquiry towards suggestions for dealing with what is, perhaps, the most urgent of current problems bequeathed by the war. It is two-fold. On the one hand our statesmen are confronted by the task of re-orienting the public expenditure towards a policy of Reconstruction. On the other, the aims and sanctions of private expenditure call for a certain moral revision, whereby may be compassed a more harmonious living together of rich and poor, and a more co-operant working together of capitalist and labourer.

That the more glaring evils of our business and financial system are the defects of its qualities, will hardly be gainsaid. It follows that for these evils, there must be found their natural remedies. And by natural remedies is, of course, meant such as tend to develop the qualities and minimize the defects even towards elimination of the latter.

What precisely are those qualities and these defects? There is at hand no clear and definite answer of the kind that commands general assent. From this lack of knowledge there ensues a confusion of purpose, and a frustration of action that go on all the time and pervade every community. Such is the social situation from which emerges the antithesis of Business and Philanthropy. The equivalent futility of science with its associated nullity of philosophy is known as the divorce of Economics and Ethics. And this disharmony of thought is the most general expression

* For the first of a series of studies under this title, see the *Sociological Review*, No. 1, Vol. XI (Spring 1919).

of the malady under review. It therefore affords the right starting point for that fresh survey of the whole field which here, as so frequently elsewhere, the sociologist is driven to undertake by failure of co-ordination among his brother specialists.

The sociologist looks, or tries to look, with the eye of each and all the specialists in turn. But he is under no illusion as to the resulting vision. To glimpse in succession with the specialists their several aspects of reality is by no means to ensure a vision of the whole. It is but the preparatory step towards attainment of unity. It develops the habit of co-operating with the specialists. Given this co-specializing habit of mind, what further advance is needed for the synoptic vision? There is needed the quality which comes from such wrestling with the spirit of unity as did the Hebrew patriarch with the Angel of God. By the grace of unity alone can the sociologist be saved from the temptation which besets the specialists and such as rely on "expert advice." That temptation is complementary to the error of "the man in the street." He, without specialist guidance, makes his judgment on a broad issue from general impressions. The specialists and their "practical" world of "administration," public and private, are prone to pronounce on the whole after studying merely its parts. But each one who yields to this temptation is, we have the warrant of the psalmist for saying, a fool, because he hath said in his heart there is no unity. The sense and the Power of Unity come into being and do their work, in the measure that the specialists' dry bones of piecemeal inspection are quickened by the breath of simultaneous vision.

Re-surveying the economic field, what, in broad outline, does the sociologist see? He sees the forges and factories of the machine-industry engaged in harnessing to the chariot of man an untamed Pegasus of incredible power and speed. He sees, as he looks back over the past century and a half, a succession of statesmen who in turn fill the office of charioteer; and all the time Pegasus plunging in a moral void. At first the chariot seemed to be mounting heaven-ward. The ecstatic charioteer cries *laissez-aller*, let him go, give him his head! Anon, there is a fall into abysmal depths whose grimy shades suggest not heaven but its opposite pole as objective of the journey. Thereupon a new driver mounts the chariot and makes frantic application of whip and bridle to change the course. But even if Pegasus were trained to answer the rein, on what course, towards what destination, shall the charioteer drive him? That is the question. Who is sufficient unto the answer? Indeed is the question answerable so long as the divorce of economics and ethics sustains a Business that is hard or mean, non-social or anti-social, and a Philanthropy that is blind or maudlin, or both?

II.

THE INSURANCE OF WEALTH.

Moralists declaim against the spirit of our times, as being dominated by what they call a "Money-Economy." Implicitly accepting this criticism, hortatory persons urge us to return to the ways of our more industrious ancestors, and so practise what might be called a "Goods-Economy." In more usual words, we are advised to concentrate on greater production. Others again affirm that the only true objective is a Life-Economy and even beyond that a Civic-Economy. Of the former we have a statement in Ruskin's oft-quoted phrase, "there is no wealth but life." For reminder of the latter, there is the sacred saying that unless the Ideal buildeth the city, the watchman waketh but in vain; and there is the Aristotelean maxim that while men labour for life, they make cities for the sake of "the good life."

Here are different Orders of Economy, or Principles of Work, which it might be well to distinguish, difficult though be that exercise of thought. Even the most cultivated of Statesmen are given to the confusing of them. The distinguished

Chancellor of Oxford University, for instance, recently made this pronouncement. The clue to University Reform, was, he said, Finance. Is it then in the subsoil of a Money-Economy that the leaders of our Intellectuals find the root of all wisdom? Testimony to that spiritual perversion is perhaps discoverable in the well-established custom by which universities invariably elect their chief officer from the magnates of the Temporal Power.

Thus at a time when the Universities (which are collectively the cloistered side of the Spiritual Power) voluntarily, continuously, systematically, subordinate themselves to the Temporal Power, what wonder that whole classes of the community put their faith in the primacy of money over goods and life! Do not the directing classes struggle passionately for profit, rent, interest, as ends in themselves, and similarly the working classes for wages? But this means in effect a concentration of the organized forces of Capital and Labour, on the raising of prices without regard to the kind of goods produced, or the quality of life which they serve.

Who then is left to lead and man a genuine movement for a goods-economy? There are left those masses of the common people who stand outside the ranks of organized labour; there are left the professional classes who are too humble to climb into the juggernaut of speculative investment; happily also are left the emotional arm of the spiritual power, amongst whom, in addition to the clergy, and the women not yet gone into politics or "higher education," may be counted practitioners of the fine arts, still immune to the lure of mammon. In this uncovenanted grouping of the disinherited poor, with servitors of souls, queens of home, masters of thought, makers of beauty, are to be found the natural leaders of the needed campaign for a life-economy, and there are many signs of their being astir.

But for guidance in the transition from a money-economy to a goods-economy, one naturally turns to the specialists in economic science. These, we know, march under the Gold Standard. But whither does that standard lead? We have perhaps more definite knowledge of where it does not lead, and the conditions of going thither. Yet, on certain suppositions, the destination of the gold regiment is fairly clear. If currency, in whatever shape or form, is not issued except under reasonable certainty of redemption in gold, and if gold be taken as coming nearest of all things to a permanent stability in value, then certain results follow; others may or may not ensue. What follows is that the strong arm of the creditor-classes is strengthened. Not only are these favourites of fortune endowed with facilities to collect their long-term debts in full, but they are often given the chance of extracting from their debtors something over and above. So also under the gold standard will the creditor-nations be put in a position to do justice upon the debtor-nations and further be afforded an opportunity of exercising mercy!

What the doctrine of gold-convertibility does not concern itself about is whether or no the tools go to those that can handle them in the service of life. Hence it is cold to pleas for increasing the quantity, and improving the quality of production. Equally indifferent is it to the social reactions involved in the mere ownership and control of money. In short, the Gold Dogma is like university chancellors, an institution well adapted to a financial age. Hence it is entirely natural and true to type that bankers and orthodox economists should be lustily crying out for a return to gold-convertibility as a necessary step towards sound finance and healthy trade. But before deciding to follow their lead, let us try to see more precisely whither they would take us. Recall then the economic features of the past decade or so.

Recently the nation concentrated on the making of "goods" and the rendering of services useful only in war. The return of peace, therefore, found us saddled with an accumulation of profits and savings recorded in paper claims, unrepresented by assets. Yet realize that the thing called "inflation" exists to-day, not only in

the circulating paper claims called "currency," but also and to an immensely greater extent in the fixed paper claims called "securities." Here are two kinds of business ballooning which it were well carefully and critically to distinguish. The first is inflation ordinarily so-called. For the second a convenient term is lacking, since the process is by no means on all fours with the dubious American custom known as "watering of stock." A hint of the needed word is conveyed by reflection on the extensive recourse to advertisement in the issue of securities alike by the government for war and by financiers in peace. Is it not then permissible to describe the implied expansion of capital values as a process of "securities-puffing": a term which would thus stand alongside the more generally known and widely reprobated currency-inflation?

This distinction helps to the understanding of certain things otherwise obscure. For instance, is it not too much assumed that currency-inflation in war finance and the simultaneous securities-puffing are something different from and opposed to what went on before? Against the controllers of currency, during the generation before the war, economists make no charge of inflation. Logic indeed would forbid them, since gold-convertibility was then in full operation. But think of the ceaseless output of securities which then issued from the whole ring of Finance Houses, big, middling and little. On the public they floated a continuous array of their paper galleons, usually borne on the high winds of the financial press, sometimes conveyed by the eddying currents of "city" gossip, and rumour. It was the nature of these securities that they generously capitalized the recorded profits of old-established undertakings, or still more generously capitalized either the anticipated profits of prospective business enterprise, or the future interest of mortgaged properties, or the sporting chance of fabulous dividends. On this footing was secured the valorization of these paper claims through the Stock Exchanges, and so was achieved their ranking as sources of bank credit; and hence their potential conversion into currency.

To take an illustration at haphazard; the first glancing of a random search into the columns of the financial press. A certain diamond company of good repute and long-standing paid in 1919 a dividend of 800 per cent. on its deferred shares. The magnitude of this reward to deferred expectations was by no means a windfall of postwar extravagance. True, no dividend was paid for 1917 and 1918, still that of 1919 was a mere fifty per cent addition to the dividend of 1913, when the rate was 750%.

Now at what increase in the capital value of the deferred shares, did the Stock Exchange rate the dividend of 800 per cent? The equivalent capitalization they valued at over 9000 per cent. How explain the apparent discrepancy? The excess of capitalization probably measured the Stock Exchange's expectation of a "bonus." And what is a bonus? It is product of a custom which forbids the distribution of annual profit beyond a rate deemed decent and reasonable. Above that limit profits are carried to reserve and accumulated until such time as they can be conveniently "issued" as "capital" in the shape of a "bonus" or free gift to shareholders. Like many other financial devices, the bonus would seem to be a mode of securities-puffing imported from America being probably an adaptation to English habits, of the operation called "cutting the melon." Somewhat shyly and tentatively introduced in pre-war finance, the bonus is now so thoroughly domesticated and well-established an institution of the "city" that its record passes without comment in the ordinary news columns of the press.

Thus it has come about that these modernized stories of Alnaschar's basket are not so exceptional as might be thought. Tell the tale of the Fortunate Mine in the company of those "in the swim" and you will hear it approached, equalled or capped half a dozen times over, and, not in mining only, but throughout the

field of investment from the making of sewing cotton and the fabricating of imitation silk stockings to the chemistry of explosives and the extraction of oil.*

This spectacular phase of the investment world brings about strangely ironic situations. There are public-spirited men who sacrifice time and energy to ensuring that Governments shall neither raise money without a scrutinized sanction nor expend it unchecked by a critical publicity. There are ardent personalities who give themselves to mitigating the struggles of classes handicapped in the race of life. There are tender souls who scrupulously avoid the infliction of suffering moral, mental, or economic on all persons high and low with whom they are brought into contact. Of all these good folk, the salt of the earth, there is possibly not one who would experience a twinge of conscience in holding securities designed to extract, for irresponsible shareholders, toll and tribute from the community by raising to scarcity-level the price of staples like oil, coal, steel, copper, cotton, or other article among the necessities of public and domestic life. In former ages and simpler times, when the truth that we are all members one of another was less obscured by social complexities, the beneficiaries of such gains would have incurred the opprobrium which carried a definite penalty. In those days "forestallers" and "regraters" were delivered on a hurdle to the public-stocks; to-day the custom is reversed, for are not the public stocks delivered to the Privateer Investor by the obsequious Levites of the Golden Calf? The miracle that demonstrates the power and sustains the prestige of his cult has been discerned by the genius of Mr. Kipling. In an appeal for war-loan he told his readers how Invested Money, like the Army and the Navy, is in ceaseless activity for our benefit, that in fact it works a twenty-four hours shift, and, moreover, for absentee owners.

The ironies of conduct and idiosyncracies of personality that run with the current divorce of ethics from economics are, to be sure, here adduced as but examples of a social process. Bounding dividends and rocketing capitalizations even if exceptional things nevertheless produce their dramatic effect; they set a standard of desire and offer a tempting vision of the might-be. The resultant tremors of expectancy course up and down the whole social scale. There comes about an immense diversion of energies from the making of things and the rendering of services to the creation of securities. Bankers, brokers and lawyers are lured into ways that make them appear almost an organization for the purveyance of long-term credits and their maintenance and collection. The undefined multitudes that stand between the dividend warrants of the rich and the cash wages of the workers are bedazzled by the thought of themselves recruiting the creditor-classes. The same subtle temptations insensibly turn the heads of business from the arts of engineering to the artifices of profiteering. Thus there sets in a tendency to overgrowth of the creditor-classes, which if not checked may develop into something comparable to the widespread parasitism of the animal world. Economists may hint at justification in the auditors' certificates attached to big profits. But this is to miss the point, which is a moral or more strictly perhaps, a psychological one. The gravamen of the charge is against the *expectation* of high profits on paper claims held by irresponsible shareholders.

For the exploiting of this social situation Finance has long been elaborating both a definite strategy of campaigning and also tactics for battalions deployed in

* For another sample illustration take the case of one of the many Lancashire cotton mills which are now seemingly passing from control of manufacturers (whose traditional interests are those of a goods-economy) into that of financiers. This particular mill has a capital in £5 shares, of which 10/- is paid up, and half of this by way of bonus. This mill has been purchased by a syndicate that paid the shareholders £16 per share, an appreciation of 6,400 per cent.

the great game of securities-puffing. And for these keen experts in mob psychology the war was no lustrum of purification, but a time of retirement for the burnishing of their own particular weapons, as the current output of the Finance Houses shows. Unfortunately there do not seem to be any statistical data by which to assess, in terms of the burden on production, this vast and continuing mobilization of future values. Silently and subtly the system works towards intensifying the pull of the creditor-class on the national output. In spite of a formal maintenance of the gold standard, (which the war crisis of August 1914 showed to be entirely dependent on public confidence, and so far merely nominal), there can be little doubt that industry was, even before the war and indeed for a long time back, in course of being loaded with an overwhelming burden of "fixed" charges. The effect was then temporarily masked by the economies of Trust organization, by the great output of gold from the mines, by the increasing exploitation of the "backward races," and by the concentrated gathering of the world's raw materials into the hands of the industrialized nations, each of them furnished with its own "big stick." If this reading of pre-war finance be verified, then we perceive war finance as but the natural goal of the way we were previously going. The dominating tendencies of the former were, as we have seen, (a) the expansion of securities beyond productive assets, (b) a veiled and fitful inflation of the currency through accumulating margins of unredeemed credit-money, issued against the securities, and (c) maintenance of gold-convertibility as a kind of re-insurance in the periodic business of securities-puffing. Is it not through the operation of (a) and (b) continued and exaggerated during the war that we are burdened with over seven thousand millions of Government bonds and some three hundred millions of unredeemable Treasury notes? Is it not through the re-imposition of gold-convertibility that the creditor-classes now propose to valorize their new securities?

These comparisons and much other evidence of like nature, compose into a presentation of the war as, in its economic aspects a magnified version of the profiteer's ideal known in the slang of the market as a "trade boom." And as the boom has its natural sequel in the "crisis" of deflation, so from the entail of the war emerges the thorny problem of profiteers' fortunes and their influence on the cost of living.

Below all this tangle of economic ills, we have to search for their deeper roots in our social system. Regarded from this more human standpoint we see the finance of the "Victorian Peace" as product of a situation in which the creditor and directing classes, themselves torn by the strife of conflicting groups and individuals, were driven into a struggle for self-preservation without adequate regard to the general interest. A system so developed being well adapted to the needs of an internecine struggle for survival amongst the nations, came to its natural fruition in the war. In the medley of forces thus originating in our veiled strife of industry and culminating in the open strife of nations, business men and property-owners were of course themselves victims of a blind drive of things. Our analysis indicates two factors in particular, as having been ever at work, thrusting them ruthlessly into unsocial courses. They were impelled to strive for an over-appreciation of capital values, first because the risks of depreciation were grave, and seemingly (to them) uninsurable otherwise: secondly because the penalty of impoverishment was lapse into the industrial inferno, with its terrifying consequences, formidable, above all, to their women-folk and their children.

Under such circumstances, the pursuit of appreciation in monetary values and especially in the values of long-period indebtedness becomes an art in which uncurbed instincts of survival are likely to play a large part. Now the partiality of the creditor-classes for gold-convertibility is assuredly sustained not less by

instinct than by reason. Certainly they are far from any conscious preference for booms and crises as a means of appreciating the long-term debts secured to them under a system rich in expedients for mortgaging the future. Yet there can be little doubt that the wind of inflation that blows in the boom is by no means all squeezed out in the subsequent ebb of deflation. During each rise of the financial cyclone something doubtless is added to the capital values of the creditor-classes which remains as a net gain. And by the maintenance of the gold-standard are they not enabled to collect that surplus in the final liquidation? This same line of reasoning if applied to the creditor-nations in their dealings with the debtor-nations would presumably disclose a hidden motive at once in their partisanship for the gold standard and their addiction to great armaments.

The dogma of convertibility, whatever its original use, would thus appear to have taken on a secondary purpose which is of the nature of subconscious or instinctive camouflage. But exposure of these anti-social adaptations is valuable in the degree that it passes beyond criticism to constructive suggestion. Does it point a way toward the discovering and shaping of an economic instrument that might do the regulative work attributable to the gold standard, and yet remain free of its defects and misuses? The need clearly is for a system which while satisfying the legitimate desires of the creditor-classes for reasonable insurance against wealth depreciation, lends itself to predatory exploitation neither by financial groups nor by governments.

Restate our problem of wealth insurance in more positive form, and it becomes a question of stabilizing values; and that again implies a limitation of return in the shape of profit, interest, rent. Yet industry must not be checked in its pursuit of a progress which the accountant will legitimately record as an enhancement of the capital values embodied in bettered environment and finer people. The solution thus appears to lie with a financial system, if such there be, that stabilizes the values of individually owned property, and simultaneously promotes the agencies and advances the impulses that augment the community values of the social heritage.

In point of fact, as indeed the student of evolution would expect, a more socialized type of banking and finance has been growing up in a quite natural way to meet the needs of simple, unsophisticated folk, like peasants and workmen. It is but little known in the metropolitan capitals, yet this more stable and sounder system of finance is of a growth that has long passed the experimental stage. Moreover in their start, new adaptations are, to the vitalists of a school more ancient than that of "economic science," significant rather in their smallness than in their magnitude, as the principle of the leaven and the mustard seed declares.

The contention is that the types of institution known as the Co-operative Bank and the Public Utility Society are the leaven destined, under favourable conditions of growth and direction, to transform and socialize our over-individualist finance. The utility society stresses alike the limitation of profits and the building up of insurance reserves in the betterment of environment; the co-operative bank emphasises the limitation of interest and the selective value of skill, character, and personality in creating a hidden reserve of insurance. The public utility society, (as for example in garden-city-making), capitalizes betterment of environment in such a way as increasingly to identify its own corporate goodwill with the Common Good. Similarly, the co-operative bank capitalizes those qualities of personality which make for the harmony of individual and social interests. Thus does philanthropy become good business; and the public utility society and co-operative bank are put into a position where they can outbid the millionaire since *his* philanthropy cannot evade the criticism of being a means to publicity!

What has the Co-operative Banker to say to the dogma of gold-convertibility?

He accepts it as a conditional expedient, but denies its permanent validity. If the organized manufacturers of credit-money (which is what the joint stock bankers are), labour under a chronic or recurrent temptation to overdo this business, then any tendency to sand their sugar must be kept in check by a corrective agency, which is indisputably beyond their influence. To exercise this inhibition on the bankers is what the practice of convertibility professes to do; though how far it is effective is not easy to discover. But in any case it would be well if the same impulses that prompt to the manufacture of credit-money were also operative in tending to check inflation. In this connection it has to be noted that the joint-stock banker manufactures credit, not so much with an eye to its use, but rather for sale on a footing of profit, very much like any ordinary article of commerce. In effect, his business is to buy private debts and sell credits to which custom and usage give the stamp of quasi-public ranking. And if the banker does not sell this credit-money, like an auctioneer, to the highest bidder, yet his practice comes perilously near to that way of doing business, for he is but a cog in the grinding wheels of Mammon!

Contrast now with this financial type, one committed to a different mode in the manufacture of credit, the Co-operative Banker. He manufactures credit not for sale, but for use, and moreover for direct use by the productive group of which he is himself an active member. In no mere legal sense he and his group are responsible for the redemption of the credit they create and issue. By the nature of the case and their own position in the economic cycle they are bound themselves to produce not documents, but goods and services valued by the community as equivalent to the given credit. The Co-operative Bank, is short, is an item in an industrial system that subordinates money to goods and services, while the Joint Stock Bank tends too much to reverse this process. Thus in the former resides an impulse towards economy in the use of money and credit, which is absent in the latter. And increasingly as his system expands and ramifies through the whole body of industry, trade and agriculture, the Co-operative Banker sees how to effect that maximum economy in the use of credit and money which is the positive ideal whose negative is avoidance of inflation. It is less by indirect methods such as the gold-convertibility that he proposes to work, and more by the direct method of open and deliberate estimates of requirement in reference to costs and returns, and their continuous apportionment and correlation through local and regional clearing-houses linked into a national system.

It cannot be pretended that the co-operative banking movement has made, as yet, any substantial contribution either to the theory or practice of monetary units, as for example by applying thereto the scientific data and methods of index-numbers. But this problem of the unit, which at present seems so baffling, would not unlikely be greatly simplified, indeed perhaps prove to be more than half-solved, under a fully developed system of co-operative banks. For the present mystification of banking and finance there would be substituted the fullest of scientific accounting; for the competitive secrecy of trade credits, there would be substituted open co-ordination, through clearing houses of banking on one side with industry, agriculture, and commerce, on the other. It is altogether in line with the evolution of units in general, to suppose that such changes in method as the above should lead to the discovery and use of a scientific monetary unit in place of the archaic and empirical gold standard.

By the very nature of their aims and methods the co-operative bank and the public utility society act, as we have seen, towards the stabilizing of values, and moreover in ways that are complementary in a strictly scientific sense; for the one builds up an insurance fund, by selective improvement of population and the other similarly by direct betterment of environment. Thus are present, inherent in the

economic situation, the elemental conditions of a stable yet progressive life, since organism and environment, people and place, are in adjustment on a footing of interacting amelioration. Imagine the social reactions of such a system operating in a considerable way, and for sufficient time to make its betterments of environment and improvement of population a marked feature in the life and well-being of the community at large. For one thing would not these accumulating enrichments of the social milieu increasingly mitigate the struggle to get rich quick, into which the present evils of industrial life impel both the bolder and cunninger types? As things are, do not the crowding and squalor of our industrial towns, the garishness of the great cities, the dullness of the villages, combine to drive men mad with desire to escape into the tranquil but costly private elysium of a "country house," with its assured seclusion of park and garden?

Yet while communist in its policy of environmental betterment, co-operative and public utility finance is in another aspect markedly individualist. Because founded on voluntary association, and the public spirit that goes therewith, its mode of working is towards the social selection and economic advancement of a type characterized by self-reliance, independence, initiative, yet also guided by an informed sense of communitary well-being. If there could be established that basis of security in the material conditions of life which the wage-earners rightly demand, we might see realized also, under the system of co-operative and public utility finance, that economic independence of the individual and the family which many believe to be the main motive of industrial progress. Thus, given an organized endeavour of this kind made in combination with certain other movements, we should advance at once towards the stabilizing of values, and the maximising of production, along a course putatively free from the drawbacks and inhibitions alike of conventional and insurgent schools, yet claiming some of the qualities of both.

What then are these complementary movements, needed for the fruition of co-operative and public utility finance? There must manifestly be the fullest application both of the physical and the organic sciences, the former being indispensable to the largest output and most economical distribution and transport; the latter holding promise of increased food supplies, and improved health of the community. The technical excellences and increments that flow from a thorough-going application of the physical sciences are reasonably assured, since the war demonstrated so convincingly what the chemists and engineers can do for industry when put in command of adequate resources. The advent of the organic sciences into power is less certain. Their systematic application to agriculture and to domestic and social life would mean the coming of a Life-economy. To this promised subordination of material to vital values many indications do indeed point; witness the recent rise and current extension of Agricultural Colleges; of Schools of Forestry, of Domestic Science, of Hygiene; the long-delayed Ministry of Public Health; the advance of Eugenics, crude though it be. Again in the more subjective aspects of life, notable is the advance of science especially in the schoolroom and the playground. This means that general education is becoming less an affair of empirical pedagogy, and more the skilled application of psychology. Assuredly, our teachers are ceasing to be open to the reproach of cram, pedantry and social partisanship. They are developing into a richly varied group of practising psychologists, and so are preparing to take their part in the re-directing of industry towards adapting our towns, villages, cities to child-life.

Testimony more striking if less enduring, to the renewing dominance of life is borne by the vogue of dancing that pervades all classes, all countries of the western world. First ostracised by the zeal of Puritans and then banished by the cult of machinery, Terpsichore has returned. Her ubiquitous invocation is, maybe, woman's way of re-domesticating youthful warriors after their prolonged bout

of that ultra-masculine exercise, war-dancing. Anyhow the revival of the ball-room signifies a large release of vital energies. And what purpose will engage these liberated human forces? The making of homes is woman's determination, fortified by nature, but severely handicapped by universal shortage of bricks and mortar. And this famine everywhere of houses and furniture, intensified in many countries by lack of food, is a reminder that something more than home-building instincts is needed wisely to direct the energies that stream from the titanic power-stations of modern industry. Where is to be found the requisite knowledge and its correlative fund of goodwill? The ship of State is seemingly adrift. The social and civic sciences can hardly claim that they are ready to take the helm; and if they did, who amongst officers and crew would give ear to their claim? Indeed, last of all according to pre-war canons of precedence, would come these social and civic sciences in the list of industrial directors. Yet, how, without their guidance are we to renew, in adaptation to our own times, that Civic-economy which has been the distinguishing feature of every high civilization in the past? Such considerations may serve as a warning not to be too hopeful of an assured approach towards Civic-economy, even if by some stroke of a magician's wand, the control of industry and the direction of credit were given into the hands of co-operative banks and public utility societies!

NOTE.—Of this "Third Alternative," a continuance and sequel will appear in the next number of the *Sociological Review*. It will be remembered that the Cities Committee is responsible for this series of *Papers for the Present*, of which this is No. 7

REVIEWS.

THE AGE OF HOPE.

THE CENTURY OF HOPE. A Sketch of Western Progress from 1815 to the Great War. By F. S. Marvin. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1919. 6/- net.

THE period with which this book treats has experienced even more than the usual vicissitudes of praise and blame. It was for the greater part of its length immensely impressed with its own virtue and enlightenment, its great deeds, its prosperity, and its success. But with all its pride in science its last days were tinged with obscurantism, and its triumphs in peace ended in the widespread destruction and sufferings of the great war. Hence of late it has been unduly blamed and sometimes even accused of failing to carry out its programme by those who had no wish that that programme should be carried out, and little sympathy with the century's purposes and ideals. It is the aim of Mr. Marvin—already known as the author of *The Living Past*—to vindicate the age that has just gone by, to show how triumphantly it extended the powers and the sympathies of Man, to prove the indestructible nature of its chief conquests, to indicate the hopes for the present and the future of which it is the justification. In less than three hundred and fifty pages, packed with matter, yet abounding in brief sketches of character, in apt quotations, in lucid descriptions, in aphorisms that deserve remembrance, he surveys the whole century, politics and literature, science and invention, education and religion, progress within the nation and among the nations. Nowhere, perhaps, is he more successful than in unravelling so that all may understand, the intricate course, the essential stages, of scientific discovery, or in connecting the great literature of the period with the general progress of society. Here is an example of the author's skill in connecting the individual with his environment, and showing the close relationship of all phases of activity:—

In 1831 an exiled Italian landed at Marseilles, a man to whom the passion for national independence was better tempered by an enthusiasm for the kindred good of all mankind than in any other thinker of his time. Mazzini, the Carbonaro, the man of letters, the life-long martyr to the humanitarian ideal, is the best link in this age between philosophy and the politics of nations. And in the League of "*La Giovine Italia*," which he founded in exile in France, he proclaimed the gospel of the coming day—"Moral unity and Fraternity in a faith common to all Humanity."

But while Mr. Marvin is proud both of his age and of the country to which he owes allegiance, it is one of his cardinal principles that neither can be considered alone; that every age is the heir to all the ages that have gone before, the parent of all that are to come after—a link in a chain without beginning or ending: and that each country is but an element in a greater whole, influenced by and influencing its neighbours, its fellow workmen in the great task of building and maintaining human civilization. His period is "an age of history as truly as an age of hope." The keynote of modern biological and sociological thought is that "the organism is to be interpreted historically as the issue of an infinite process of growth and adaptation, the fitting of the being to the fullest use of its environment. His only lapse from this historic spirit is perhaps a readiness to exaggerate the scientific triumphs of the last hundred years as compared with those of earlier periods. On the international character of science and "the growth of a general or European frame of mind" he never fails to insist, and he loves to trace how one

country after another had had its share in leading up to the great discoveries—even though in one place he forgets to point his own moral by showing that in the invention of the steam-boat, Jouffroy the Frenchman, preceded by many years the launching of the Comet on the Clyde in 1812, or Fulton's experiments on the Seine. But much as he prizes the international character of our civilization, he does not therefore disregard or despise nationality. A true comity of nations is his aim. Of England and France he speaks thus:—

Near enough for constant intercourse, separate enough for national independence, they have developed on parallel but often contrasted lines, with frequent though diminishing hostility, always in modern times the leaders of European progress, now, as we believe, united in a permanent bond of friendship for freedom and mankind.

In praising the United States for the great vindication of human freedom in the Civil War, he adds, "Without this sense of personal dignity, the nation can have no conscience, and nations without conscience make a world without humanity."

Naturally in a book treating so briefly such a variety of important questions, many differences of opinion will be excited; but I only propose to criticize on two points. The first of these is the small place given to Sociology, treated almost as a mere appendage to Biology. Many would be inclined to think the extension of scientific method to social phenomena the greatest intellectual advance of the age, even though Sociology had not yet attained the same status as her elder sisters, and that this capital advance deserved at least one of the thirteen chapters to itself, instead of being relegated to odd corners and occasional references. Nor do the great sociologists fare much better. Comte and Spencer, indeed, are each mentioned four or five times, but only incidentally and not specially in regard to Sociology. Le Play is in still worse case, for he is only mentioned once, and that in connection with his support of "exhibitions," and his enquiry into the condition of the workers. Certainly this passage would never suggest to the reader that Le Play was a great sociologist who had solved the problem that had baffled Montesquieu by showing that the environment acted through the forms of industry it imposed.

But a more general difficulty arises from an exaggeration of the very quality that has made the book so valuable. The author is not content to show how much ground for hope his century gives. He must find every, or almost every, product of it, excellent. Even though he recognizes that "the rush to action" may with some show of reason be held to have contained "the seeds of the catastrophe of 1914," yet he seems to rejoice immensely in all this fussy inconsequence and to admire the modern parish as "a network of societies and agencies for improving the moral and social conditions of its members." He praises T. H. Green, although such praise seems entirely to contradict his own eulogies on science and history as the foundations of our civilization; for Green, to judge by the quotation given—one of the longest in the book—was essentially unhistoric and unscientific. His influence, too, was purely insular, or even local.¹ It would seem that if our author is right in his general treatment of human progress, the influence of Green must be considered a strong argument for the prevalence of reaction in late years. That reaction is generally thought to have culminated in the war, but Mr.

1. I was at Cambridge when Green's influence was at its height in Oxford. I never heard of him, and very little of Seeley, who is spoken of as a Cambridge counterpart. I doubt if he had any influence on the continent. On a steamboat from Salonica to Constantinople in 1914, I discussed Comte with a Polish Mahomedan, and had a lively controversy on John Stuart Mill with a Roumanian Jew, But I am pretty sure nobody on board had ever heard of T. H. Green.

Marvin is on far surer ground when he sees in the way the great crisis was met a proof of the growth of popular wisdom.

"If we may include in it (the definition of wisdom) the rapid intuition of the rightness and true bearing of a great issue, like the defence of Belgium, then our whole people may be said to have possessed it and to have advanced notably in wisdom since the mistake and apathy of 1864 and 1870. If it is a part of wisdom to persevere staunchly in decision once taken and to show heroic fortitude and unfaltering discipline, cheerfully, even light-heartedly, for over four years, on the field, in prison, and on the sea, then the record is bright indeed."

If the century of hope ended in disaster, we at least can say, with the author, that our previous training had not been in vain, that we met our difficulties wisely and bravely, and that we may hope still—nay now more than ever.

S. H. SWINNY

FUTURISM IN POLITICS.

DEMOCRAZIA FUTURISTA. DINAMISMO POLITICO. F. MARINETTI. (Facci: Milano), 1919.

A Political Party of very advanced views is seeking to establish itself in Italy; it is not a "Labour" movement, but, rather, the policy of a group of artists, whose leader, (F. Marinetti), has published a very striking book, dedicated to the members of the Futurist Political Party in Milan, Florence, Ferrara and other big Italian cities, and to the *Arditi*.

It is, says the author, the first time in history that a Political Movement has grown out of an association of artists. This movement is quite detached, however, from the Futurist Artistic Movement and its followers are not called upon to cherish or cultivate the poetry or the paintings of that group. Laugh and jeer as we may at the Futurist art, nevertheless the fact remains that this young and wild Italian set has influenced the world of art in a quite extraordinary manner. Our extremist "modern" groups here, the Vorticists and the London Group, for example, are but adaptations and echoes of the Italian Futurism wedded to French Cubism. One English artist who is now exhibiting in ten American museums, was sent to the ends of the earth in search after new forms and ideas, roused to sacrifice everything, in one great creative effort, as the result of this Italian movement—which he was too individual to follow!

As politicians, where do they stand? To begin with, they are above all Patriots and Nationalists—hoping to create a new Italy which shall arise from its antique dust and be as great as in the days of the Roman Empire. They stand, they say, for Intellectual Heroism; and that they are capable of physical courage also, is shown by a list, two pages long, of Futurists who were killed and wounded in the war—among the latter being the author of this book. His "dynamism" has been taken for a form of militarism: but he desires to abolish conscription. The Futurists desire simultaneously to abolish Marriage, the Church, and Conscription. And they wish to turn the Pope out of Italy!

More than anything, it was, perhaps, the war in Tripoli—one of the preludes to the great war—that caused these young men to come forward as Futurists, and we who remember Marinetti's efforts, in London, to bring war to our senses by means of his poems, can understand him better now than we did then. This great "conflagration" has but made deeper the impress of his ideas, which have flowered from art into Politics. We must realise that Futurism is logically Italian—for in

Italy more than anywhere else in Europe—save perhaps Greece—inheritance of past greatness has been a burden which all but obliterated efforts in the present.

To liberate Italy from the Tourist Trade is one of Marinetti's ideals, no less than to give votes and liberty to women. If he goes to extremes, is it not because the pendulum swings from one extreme to another? The Passéist obsession had a stranglehold in that country from which no "moderate" could get free. So that, logically, the Futurist dream of renovation becomes definitely revolutionary in action, while aiming at a strong free Italy, (no longer oppressed by her great past), in which the maximum of liberty and the maximum of production shall go hand in hand with a new morality and the reduction of the "complicated inefficiency" of the present military system.

Marinetti desires citizens to be each one prepared for self-defence in case of need; and he desires the annexation of such boundaries on land and sea as he deems vital to the development of Italy. His most original point is the insistence upon the value of improvisation, and he desires to maintain a military condition in which a small number of armed men can be quickly improvised into a great army in case of need. His idea is to have everything *elastic*, so that the capacity for improvisation which has proved invaluable in the great war, could be called upon for all purposes at a moment's notice, and set in action unfettered. His faith in the inventive genius of the Italian is unbounded. His chief political idea is thus a great belief in "*Improvvisazione elastica intensiva*"; which shall allow free play to the creative forces of humanity. The war has destroyed Romanticism and mediocrity, he contends, and from it has emerged a new race of men, brutal, frank, great improvisors, with no thought of the morrow, who—at any cost—refuse to be governed from offices, libraries and museums!

While turning down Cappa, Comandini, Salandra, the present government and all political parties then in vogue, Marinetti spares Cavour and Mazzini—whom, he says, still live.

He expects a great spiritual renovation throughout Italy among the people, during which, he thinks, the Papacy will fall for good. He foresees an elastic society in which creative imagination will develop through the habit of improvisation and the inseparability of art and life—through "*art-azione*,"—bringing back again the old powers of divination and of prophecy.

He claims for the Futurists that they were prophets of this war: and he tells how they faced imprisonment by their "Down with Austria" meetings, while Italy was neutral. He sees Italy, under his *régime*, as once again "*illuminatrice Mondiale*"; and in a paragraph he demolishes the Papacy, Monarchy, Parliament, Senate, Marriage, Conscription, Bureaucracy, Antiquity, Proprietary rights, Laws of inheritance, existing aristocracy, and a few other such impediments to his ideas of progress, by which he believes he can rule so that his people may "live decorously," without falsehood or intrigue!

Above all he desires to arrange so that the instinct of procreation shall not run to waste. Italy has no divorce laws, and he wishes to introduce these as a step to the abolition of marriage laws. He says that in the war—when men of all races congregated in Italy—and family life was dispersed—relations became customary which he groups under this heading: "*Amore libero e rapido*." This he advocates as worth preserving and consolidating as a national law. In other words he desires improvisation in affairs of sex, without thought of the morrow, (*senza domani*)! This, he thinks, will bring his race out of the degeneration which has come, he says, from an exaggerated idea of pure love and a wrong notion of physical attraction. Forced fidelity, by means of matrimony, he considers a mistake. He is at the same time violently against the decadentism of "Wilde, D'Annunzio, Baudelaire, and

Mallarmé," and he hopes to see love "reduced to its natural proportions." He does not seem, however, to know the natural history of the evolution of marriage, and he makes no line between the ideas of man as polygamous, or of man as promiscuous:—thereby showing once again—as in his art-campaign—his very superficial scientific knowledge.

There is, however, life and clarity, as well as force of expression, in his book, and it cannot be lightly dismissed: his declaration that poetry is at war with criticism, instinct with culture, genius with pedantism, improvisation with preparation, elasticity with cut and dried planning, futurism with passéism, is, alone, of interest.

His weakness lies in such notions as that *amore libero e rapido, senza domani* will abolish "the vulgar banalities of domestic life," and produce an ideal relationship between the sexes, in which the only responsibility will be the payment—(by every male desiring children),—of a tax to the government! This he thinks will stop the sensualism caused by marriages of convenience, which degenerates his race. He mixes liberty with licence in his desire to set women free from legal bondage to men; and in trying to free men from family responsibilities, and women from responsibility to children—who will be looked after by the State. Decentralization is part of his political programme, and in one or two places he here verges almost into the tracks of Patrick Geddes, though in his refutation of family life he is as far from Geddes' civic ideals as from those of the man in the moon. He swings back, along civic lines however, in a phrase where he says we should not stop at criticism of the past, but concern ourselves with creating the future. And, like all those who stand for Devolution and Federation, he has a clear idea of Internationalism based on real Nationalism. In economics he is influenced by Henry George rather than by Karl Marx, and he quotes also the Old Testament and Brahminism in support of George's ideas, regarding ownership of land.

He is out for free justice—the judges to be elected by the people; and for co-operative agriculture, as well as for the development of water-power and the cleaning up of malarial districts.

He preaches the Nietzschean doctrine, "Live dangerously"; runs into line with Ferguson's University Militant, and is honestly seeking a moral equivalent for war, while attacking "good taste" and "*l'uniforme elegantissimo*" of hereditary culture. He desires to see the ennoblement of the entire race in place of the old limited aristocracy and he is anti-monarchical. His book is strong and invigorating; his literary style is convincing and refreshing, original and virile, showing every quality except depth of thought or scientific knowledge. He is one of those pioneer thinkers, precursors of the real Renaissance, who has not yet found the philosophy based upon bio-psychology, which alone gives ballast, balance and order to ideas of liberty. By upsetting everything in a volcanic manner, without real understanding of the six-sided crystal of life—he would bring ruin where he desires prosperity and by not knowing the fundamental sex-laws he would inaugurate a reign of licence and promiscuity, even more demoralising and depraving than any existing one amongst old-fashioned marriage systems. He is, however, a brave spirit to whom a more complete vision may come, together with that wider knowledge which would turn him into a great force, instead of being, as now, merely an interesting volcano.

AMELIA DEFRIES.

SOCIAL PURPOSE. By H. J. W. Hetherington and J. H. Muirhead. George Allen and Unwin. 10/6 net.

In the volume before us we have in the first part a discussion of the part played by will and purpose in the development of society, and in the second part the applica-

tion of the authors' conception of this to the principal institutions forming the structure of society as we find it, with suggestions as to the direction in which modifications of this structure may be expected. As the authors of this work observe, "all differences in social theory have their ultimate source in differences as to the sense in which will and purpose may be attributed to society"; and for this reason the searcher after sociological truth will open it with renewed hope. How far can it be said, however, that fresh light is here thrown on this difficult subject? To begin with, the question of the existence of a 'general will.' Its existence is assumed. We are told in the chapter on Will in Society that "underlying the ends which the individual sets before himself in a social world there is a reference to a wider end than they commonly represent, and that is none other than the maintenance of the social structure itself." On this we should like to make two comments. First, that this assumption of a common end, which few would deny, is very different from a belief in a 'general will,' and, second, that the idea that this common end must necessarily be the maintenance of the social structure does not by any means follow. Given this assumption, we are not surprised at the next conclusion, viz., that there is "a supreme form which is the appointed guardian and interpreter of the contributions of all the others to this common purpose and endowed with the power necessary to secure their harmony and efficiency." This is surely pure Hegelianism, and as such liable to result in a most dangerous elevation of the State. That it has not done so in the thought of the authors of this work is evident if we read further.

There is much of value in the second part of the book, and the part played by the State, though duly recognized, is not overstressed. We find a chapter on the Family emphasizing the fundamental importance of this institution, discussing the part it has hitherto played and showing that the modifications taking place in it due to economic and social changes are progressive rather than disintegrating, and that the Family is still the foundation of society. In the discussion on Education we find due value given to voluntary effort, especially to the Workers' Educational Association, the part assigned to the State being important but not all embracing. Not least interesting is the chapter on the Industrial System, in which revolutionary ideas, such as those of the Guild Socialists, are frankly welcomed; but the importance of the possibility of life being made tolerable to every man in his capacity of producer as well as consumer is a far cry from "the maintenance of the social structure itself."

In fact, when one puts down this most interesting book one wonders whether the theory of will and purpose is as important as one had supposed or as the authors postulated. For ourselves, we feel so much in sympathy with the practical conclusions, but somehow they do not seem to follow on the theory. Given the 'general will,' a philosophical conception which is hard for the plain man to grasp, given also in the words of the authors that the State is "the concrete embodiment of the general scale of values," we feel that an ultra conservative attitude towards all criticism of the existing structure should be the complement. Another frequent error of writers of this school is a confusion between Society and the State. This error our authors have endeavoured to avoid, as we see clearly in the chapter on International Relations. But in their theory we feel that it still remains, that Society is for them primarily the State, and just because of this they assume that the "maintenance of the social structure itself is the common end." Whereas we would rather suggest that the social structure—the State—being one group among many, is itself not an end but a means, the most important means if you will, but still only a means, the good of the individuals of which it is composed being the final end.

MARY E. CHRISTIE.

London School of Economics.

DEMOCRATIC IDEALS AND REALITY. By H. J. Mackinder. (Constable 7/6 net).

MR. MACKINDER's motto seems to be—Encourage the Angel in Man and in groups of men by all possible means but keep a weather eye open for the Beast or he may spring at any minute, and you won't abolish him by shutting your eyes and pretending that he is not there. "It used to be thought," says the author, "and sooner or later will be thought again, that the main function of the State in free countries is to prevent tyrannous things from being done, whether by offenders at home or invaders from abroad." This idea lies at the bottom of his scheme of reconstruction.

A social organisation, "The Going Concern," (as he calls it) is a marvellously intricate machine built up by many hundred years of nice adjustments. It is capable of and constantly needs readjustment, but suddenly check one of its myriad whirling wheels and you may throw the whole machine out of gear. The moral of that is that you have no right to tinker at the structure of society, whether it be in small communities or whole nations without considering how interference with one part will affect the whole.

Because Mr. Mackinder is a great geographer, his thought is balanced between determinist and libertarian factors, so the bulk of this book is naturally concerned with the readjustment of the machinery of the society of nations in due relation to material realism on one side and idealist conceptions on the other. To summarise the history and geography of the world and to correlate them in such a way as to show their interaction in the past, present and future is something of a *tour de force* and to follow the author as he marshalls his facts and builds up his conceptions of insular and peninsular sea-bases, of World Island and Heartland the reader must either be a fairly well-trained geographer or he must be prepared with the aid of a good atlas to sit down and be taught. It is true that each main argument is illustrated by a simple sketch map, which is a help.

The geographical-historical argument is summarised by the author thus:—"Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland" (the vast country lying between the Arctic Ocean and the Monsoon countries of India and China and between Peninsular Europe and the Pacific Coast). "Who rules the Heartland commands the World Island (Eurasia cum Africa).

"Who rules the World Island commands the World."

Hence, granted that it is the function of the League of Nations, as it is the function of individual states, to afford protection against tyranny, it is obviously the duty of such a League to prevent any one power from controlling the Heartland—a danger that increases as communications improve. Russia made a bid for such control, Germany nearly compassed it. Many think the "Blond Beast" is still the danger. Hence their idea of a preventive is a balanced line of self-supporting states driven as a wedge between Russia and Germany. Whether or no the Peace conference had the benefit of the views of a great geographer we cannot say, but the map of the Middle Tier of States (Fig. 31) roughly gives the boundaries as the Peace Conference has since then fixed them.

From the world-problem of adjustment Mr. Mackinder turns to home affairs. How are the threats of the Beast in the form of tyrannical organised Capital on the one hand and equally tyrannical organised Labour on the other to be prevented from crushing the whole Community, unorganised for resistance, and how is the ideal of the fullest possible life for the many to be realised? Mr. Mackinder's remedy is devolution, which, by providing for a complete social system within reasonably small areas will tend to break down the horizontal barriers in society, will prevent the impoverishment of large areas by the fatal attraction of a metropolis which skims the cream of the population from the provinces and is comparable, as a result of uncontrolled momentum, with the unbalanced growth of Prussian

power in the German Empire. The remedy in each case is the same—the creation of balancing communities each with an independent life of its own.

This remedy of organisation by localities is directly opposed to the aims of certain contemporary groups who demand organisation by interests, which, in the author's opinion can only lead to Civil War, International Class War, Anarchy and its inevitable successor Tyranny.

"It is for Neighbourliness," says Mr. Mackinder, "that the world to-day calls aloud. . . . Neighbourliness or fraternal duty to those who are our fellow-dwellers, is the only sure foundation of a happy citizenship. Its consequences extend upward from the city through the province to the nation, and to the world league of nations. It is the cure alike of the slumdom of the poor and of the boredom of the rich and of war between classes and war between nations."

H. RODWELL JONES.

SYNDICALISM AND REALISM. A STUDY IN THE CORRELATION OF CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL THEORIES. By J. W. Scott. A. and C. Black, 1919. Price 10/- net. Pp. 212, large 8vo.

THE intention in this book is to show that a relation exists between Syndicalism as expressed by such writers as Sorel, and Realism as expressed by Bergson and Russell. Let us consider first the terms of this relation. Sorel is a *poseur* who does not appear to understand industrial movements; and the references made by Mr. Scott to G. D. H. Cole do not imply any understanding of National Guilds or what used to be called Guild Socialism. Syndicalism in fact is not explained at all by Mr. Scott. And as for Realism, it is difficult to imagine that anything more than an accident of date unites Bergson with Russell, for in fact Bergson is intellectually an early form of the literary idealist. The reason for calling him an idealist is apparently because he accepts as ultimates "*les donnés immédiates de la conscience*"; but it is very doubtful if that is so. In Bergson all things dissolve. And even Mr. Russell's realism is not what Mr. Scott supposes it.

The terms of Mr. Scott's relation are not, therefore, to be found in the realm of fact. But if they were, he does not seem to know *what* relation exists between them. There may be some relation beyond the fact that both Syndicalism and Realism are new, and therefore the results of disappointment with what is old. But Futurist Painting is also new, and so is the Jazz. What follows? Surely not what Mr. Scott calls "the new philosophy of Labour." But perhaps only a strain of realism in the reviewer makes him believe that industrial policy is one thing and metaphysical theory another, and that the connection between the two is probably very slight.

C.D.B.

THE STATE. ELEMENTS OF HISTORICAL AND PRACTICAL POLITICS. By Woodrow Wilson. Special edition, revised to December 1918. Published by Harrop, 1919. Price 10/6 net.

PRESIDENT WILSON's book on the State was written about thirty years ago; and the earlier part, which deals with the nature and forms of government, bear the mark of antiquity. But it contains very clear analytical statements of some of the leading theories of the past. The first 127 pages of the book are an historical survey evidently intended for an introduction to the subject. From that point the book contains analyses of the governments of France, Great Britain, the United States, Switzerland, Italy, Belgium, Germany and Austria-Hungary in their old form, Serbia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Greece, Russia (in a page summary), Turkey and

Japan. Naturally the accounts vary in importance; but it is valuable and interesting to have so many types of government described from one point of view. The reader of to-day cannot forget that the author has shown himself to be more than a theorist; and yet our judgment of the book must not be too much coloured by our knowledge as to the present position of the author. No English Cabinet Minister could produce a book of this kind; and yet it is significant of the limitations of the book that it has been brought up to date, apparently without difficulty, by another hand. Professor Elliott, of the University of California, has performed this task very well. The book is evidently useful to the student of politics. On the other hand, the evidence is not sifted; nor is there any genuine comparison made of the systems of government. No governing ideas seem to carry the argument of the book through to its close, although doubtless the attitude of President Wilson can be found to be implied in the manner of treating the subject. The book is an early promise of the greater future of which we now have evidence.

C. D. B.

"PALESTINE OF THE JEWS."

A Study of Recent Books about Palestine and the renewal of an ancient Race.*

In a published lecture, Mr. Israel Zangwill lately went into the question of "Chosen Peoples," showing how every race in turn considers itself of the elect! He also refers to the "anti-semitic looseness" which mis-represents the Jews, and he repeats that the national greeting of Judæa was "Peace."

As an introduction to understanding the Jews no works can be so strongly recommended as those of Mr. Israel Zangwill; his older works, "Dreamers of the Ghetto," "Children of the Ghetto," etc., are especially rich in history and folklore; while "The King of Schnorrers," is one of his master studies of Jewish settlers in London. "Chosen Peoples" answers without prejudice the stupidities of certain modern anti-semitic utterances. He affirms that, "the statistics of Jewish vitality and brain power and even of artistic faculty, are amazing enough to invite investigation from all eugenisists, biologists and statesmen."

In his Conway Memorial Lecture he analyses "The Principle of Nationalities," and declares that one's nationality is decided, eventually, by where one's spirit feels at home. "Great is the Power of Place," he says, "and Nationality is its product." He rather deplores modern Nationalist trend, however, and in one place he remarks: "Nationality, deep as life, but narrow as the grave, is closing in on us," and "for full flavoured Nationality the price is war"; but "Regionalism" he thinks "has a sounder basis than even Nationalism." And he agrees in condemning the vague Internationalist, for he says, "you cannot be anything if you want to be everything. But if you are content with something, you may by analogy be many things." Thus the Jew in his own territory may become the greatest of all Internationalists. In short, to Jews and to all people Zangwill says:—"Seek not beauty nor romance. Seek ye first the Kingdom of Reality, and all these things shall be added unto you." And he believes that the culmination of modern history lies not in "every petty swashbuckling race setting up for itself," but "is seen to consist in their fusion." "The really vivid group feeling

* In addition to the books mentioned by Miss Defries, the indispensable *History of Zionism, 1600-1918*, by Nahum Sokolow (Longmans, 1919), should not be forgotten; nor George Adam Smith's *Historical Geography of the Holy Land*, with Bartholomew's superb maps, which supply the necessary physical basis for all such studies.—*Ed. Soc. Rev.*

is family-love," he writes, "and this is the essence of modern Judaism—the great family of Zionists being animated by one deep rooted desire, namely to be citizens of Palestine, even though they keep ties in Europe. Every Jew is a citizen of the country which has sheltered him—and of Palestine." In Palestine, Bentwich* remarks, the land needs Arab and Jew. "The Arab Fellah needs Jewish energy and imagination; the Jew in Palestine needs Arab hardihood and experience, for prosperous development of the country."

In supplement to Zionist literature, it is well to turn to such works as "Daniel Deronda" by George Elliot, and to "Israel" by Henry Bernstein, and novels such as "The Rise of David Levinsky"—and the "Chosen People" by American Jews; while to make one's blood run cold with horror one has only to read "The Shield," a volume of Essays written by certain just gentiles in Russia (among them Maxim Gorky), in the face of the atrocities practised by the Tsar's Government against the Jewish people while the young men of the race were away loyally fighting in the Russian Army.

A good practical introduction to Zionist literature is "Palestine—the Rebirth of an Ancient People," by Albert Hyansen, published in New York in 1917, as a useful bibliography is given: and the book brings Jewish history up to date, with concluding chapters on the Political Future of Palestine, and on economic, industrial and cultural aspects of its problems. New York is also responsible for the publication of a translation of a famous book by Moses Hess, a Jewish patriot, who, over fifty years ago, with prophetic vision, advocated the colonisation of Palestine. He foresaw a political situation resembling the state of affairs created by the war, and called it the last struggle between reaction and freedom. The fundamental principle of Hess's thought is what he terms "the genetic view" which is based upon the teachings of Spinoza. Some of his dreams have already come true. He believed that the function of Israel can be discharged only in Palestine: and he had great faith in modern Jewish science.

Through the Zionist organization also, numerous pamphlets and books may be obtained, dealing with the current phases of the movement.

Naturally since the Armistice, books have begun to appear, such as "London Men in Palestine," by Rowlands Oldicott (Arnold). But we are chiefly interested in one by a London Jew who, educated at St. Paul's School, became a Judge in Egypt. This book, (his third), is "an attempt to tell the story of what has been achieved by a small remnant of the oldest nationality in the world,—written whilst waiting at the portals of Palestine to enter the Promised Land." Its frontispiece is a map which in relief has stood for centuries upon the mantelshelves of Jews who prayed daily to be able to return to their beloved country.

Mr. Bentwich dates his preface thus ¹⁹¹⁸₅₆₇₈ —for the Jews are in the fifty-seventh century, and his short summary of Jewish history, from its beginning until the end of the eighteenth century, (christian era) is vivid; he notes that the French Revolution brought civil emancipation for the Jews in western Europe, touches upon Hess's "Rome and Jerusalem," sketches the history of Zionism and comes to the Balfour declaration of November 2nd, 1917. He gives two chapters on the Jewish colonies in Palestine, and makes a literary man's survey of Jerusalem itself; and of other "Holy Cities" near the sea of Galilee. A chapter is devoted to the Renaissance of the Schools, one to "war and the Settlements," and he concludes with his vision of the future. Lastly there is an appendix, made up of sketches of the British advance to Jerusalem under the general title of "The Redemption of Judæa" the last of which is "Passover in Jerusalem."

* "*Palestine of the Jews*," by Norman Bentwich of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, 1919.

The chief work of the Zionist colonists in Palestine has characteristically been the foundation of Hebrew schools, and a new generation "which believes that work is the true prayer," is, according to Mr. Bentwich "already settling in Jerusalem."

Before 1914 there was a population of over 12,000 in the Colonies and they were happy cultivating their land and their ideals, and in spite of untold difficulties—among these the want of water—they were prospering materially as well as spiritually.

Mr. Bentwich is not alone in thinking Jerusalem, situated at the meeting place of East and West, the natural seat for the League of Nation's Parliament.

Throughout his book he harps on the Jewish love of rustic life and of the soil! Are they not by nature a Pastoral people? He gives proofs as to the fertility of Palestine under Jewish hands.

As to the form of government that would be instituted, no one at present can speak, but Jewish minds are at work upon the problem of creating a new Ideal State in their own land.

Mr. Bentwich's book is a fit Prelude to that Report which we look for now from Professor Patrick Geddes who has been appointed Town-Planner to the Zionist Committee in Palestine—both for their cities and for their University. Thinking of this we may recall that when the Jewish Regiment, carrying the flag of Judas Maccabæus and bearing the shield of David, marched through the City of London, two historic banners were stretched across the streets. One said: "England gives Justice and Liberty," and the other, "From Zion goeth forth the Jew."

AMELIA DEFRIES.

ACTUAL REGIONALISM.*

THE study of government in the Highlands and Islands of Scotland, written by Dr. J. P. Day is a most valuable example of the best form of regionalism. It begins with a geographical and statistical analysis of the area and proceeds to an historical record of the development of government there. The problems of land tenure, education, health and many others are treated in detail with constant reference to the character and traditions of the people of the district: but the large principles of political philosophy are not neglected. Indeed the value of the book comes largely in the contribution it makes to the understanding of what the State and the Community are. It comes out very clearly for example that the State is eventually a town institution: and when its operation is extended to country districts it is very often "*urbs in rure*"—like a bowler hat upon a village green. The whole structure of local government needs to be reconsidered. Again, the relation of the State to economic life can be seen both in the success and in the failure of administration in regards to fisheries and agriculture. The connected problems of housing and the degradation of a population are very clearly seen; and nothing is more obvious than that the region cannot be dealt with effectively if separated financially and in legislation from other regions. The whole book, indeed, is an analysis of Government Reports on conditions in the district, and the existence of such reports is in itself a proof of the utility of the Great State of modern times. The chief conclusion is that the system of Government in the district is not well fitted to the local life. The Great State as a source of information has condemned the Great State as the basis of administration.

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* Public Administration in the Highlands and Islands of Scotland, by J. P. Day, Univ. of London Press, 1918, 25s. net.

